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NOTE
THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
AND SOUTH CAROLINA EVIDENTIARY
LAW: A COMPARISON AND CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence is a comprehensive code of
rules and, as finally enacted, is the joint product of the rule-
making process evolved by the Supreme Court and the legislative
processes of both houses of Congress.' As a comprehensive code
the Federal Rules of Evidence will provide an accessible and uni-
form body of rules throughout the federal system.
The practicing attorney in South Carolina will probably rec-
ognize the new federal rules as the familiar rules of evidence
presently administered in the courts of this state. However, there
are specific areas in which the federal rules differ significantly
from the evidentiary law applied in the South Carolina courts.
This note had its genesis in the belief that a service could be
rendered the practicing bar and the judiciary by cataloguing each
of the areas in which the federal rule departed from the law of
evidence that is applied by the courts of South Carolina.2 Since
1. At the direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Advisory
Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence was appointed in March 1965 by Chief Justice
Earl Warren to formulate rules of evidence for the federal courts. After numerous revisions
a revised draft of the rules was prescribed by order of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Douglas dissenting, to become effective July 1, 1973. After the rules were transmitted to
the Congress pursuant to various enabling acts, the effectiveness of the rules was deferred
until expressly approved by the Congress. The rules were amended in various respects and
approved on January 2, 1975.
2. Although we continue to believe that this effort will be of service to the bar and to
the judiciary, our original conception of what we wanted to accomplish and what we
considered to be the purpose of the note has taken on new dimensions. One natural and
hopefully beneficial result of this note will be to update the law of evidence in South
Carolina. Our intention has been to use only those cases which reflect the most recent and
authoritative exposition of the law prevailing in South Carolina. One caveat, however,
should be noted. Our intent is not to present a generalized survey of the law of evidence.
In light of the various sources available to the practicing lawyer, such as the annual
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limitations of time and space preclude a detailed analysis or dis-
cussion of all the federal rules,3 textual analysis is limited to those
areas where a particular federal rule materially conflicts with the
prevailing rule in South Carolina. A brief exposition on how the
federal rule applies is first given, which is then followed by an
explanation of the conflicting state rule. After the difference be-
tween the two rules is explained, arguments for and against each
rule are briefly presented. Generally, which rule appears prefera-
ble and the reasons for that preference are indicated. In areas
where the federal rule does not significantly diverge from the
state rule, the reader's attention is directed to a footnote accom-
panying the subsection title, wherein relevant citations to state
authority and some critical commentary are offered.
The fundamental objective of this note is to emphasize to the
legal community and to the law-making branches of the state
government the superiority of a uniform code of evidence over the
ad hoc method of fashioning rules of evidence on a case-by-case
basis. The prevailing evidentiary rules in South Carolina are de-
rived basically from the common law, with various statutory
modifications and judicial construction and interpretations. We
feel that the adoption of a uniform code would produce at least
two immediate salutary effects: (1) it would necessitate a revision
and updating of the numerous anachronistic rules that continue
to survive and which all too frequently constitute a trap for the
unwary attorney and the hapless plaintiff; and (2) by engender-
ing debate and controversy over particular rule preferences,
adopting a code of evidence would likely result in a more cogent
articulation of the true reasons and policies that underly, and
justify, specific rules.
We do not mean to say, however, that South Carolina should
necessarily adopt verbatim the Federal Rules of Evidence; the
new federal rules are merely one example of a code. Rather, the
evidence survey in the South Carolina Law Review and Professor Dreher's convenient
handbook, the authors firmly believe that their nonsurvey approach is justified. Therefore,
the reader, if he proceeds from this preface, should not expect an elaborate discussion of
recent cases; nor should he expect a detailed treatment of every area of the law of evidence
in South Carolina.
3. In addition to the four main areas of evidence covered in this note, a comparison
and analysis of the areas of judicial notice, presumptions in civil actions, privileges,
authentication and identification, contents of writings, recordings and photographs, and
miscellaneous rules are on file for observation in the South Carolina Law Review office at
the University of South Carolina School of Law.
[Vol. 28
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very process of adopting a code-involving judicial and legislative
committees and generating commentary and debate within the
legal community-would produce the kind of interest and re-
thinking of basic assumptions that is necessary if the law of evi-
dence is to continue as a meaningful instrument in the pursuit of
truth and justice.4 Hopefully, this note will illustrate the advan-
tages of a uniform system of rules which is codified and easily
accessible, and will induce South Carolina to soon follow the lead
of other states and the federal system in adopting a uniform code
of evidence.5
I. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS'
A. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
Rule 4037 recognizes the broad discretionary role of the trial
4. Such a task would not be as formidable an undertaking as it seems since there is
a wealth of material, flowing from numerous predecessors in the field of drafting rules of
evidence, that would aid greatly in such an effort. The American Law Institute's Model
Code of Evidence, the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, the California Evidence Code, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the recently enacted Maine Rules of Evidence (patterned
after the federal rules), with their supporting studies and commentary, constitute an
invaluable storehouse of general approaches and solutions to problems encountered in
drafting a uniform code of evidence.
5. As a final note the authors want to emphasize that the criticisms throughout this
note do not stem from pretentiousness or pedantry; they are offered constructively and
deferentially. We realize that in writing this note potentially embarrassing criticisms of
many of the rules of evidence currently applied by the courts of South Carolina are
advanced. In many instances, however, criticism is directed not so much to the courts'
adoption of one rule over another as it is to the often less than lucid explanation or
rationalization given a rule in the course of a judicial opinion. An excellent example is in
the area of hearsay where an unbelievable deficiency in comprehension is exemplified in
numerous judicial opinions. Of course, the members of the legal community who practice
before the courts and supply the legal briefs that ostensibly deal with such questions must
shoulder a substantial part of the responsibility for this unfortunate muddying of the legal
waters-a muddying that all too frequently finds its way into the deeper waters of the
state's highest tribunal.
We have attempted to compare carefully the South Carolina rule with the federal rule
by the use of critical commentary, giving extended analysis to rules of evidence from both
a practical and theoretical standpoint. Our criticisms, therefore, are offered in those cases
where the particular rule-be it state or federal-departs from the better reasoned and
more enlightened approach.
6. Federal rules 401 and 402 set forth the definition of relevant evidence and the
general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible, respectively. The South Carolina
definition of what constitutes relevant evidence does not materially differ from its federal
counterpart. See Francis v. Mauldin, 215 S.C. 374, 378, 55 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1949) ("All
that is required is that the fact shown legally tends to establish, or to make more or less
probable, some matter in issue and to bear directly or indirectly thereon."); accord,
Winborn v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 261 S.C. 568, 201 S.E.2d 372 (1973).
3
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Several important rules of evidence relating to relevancy were omitted from textual
discussion primarily because South Carolina case law is in accord. Nevertheless, these
rules and the South Carolina cases are highlighted briefly. For the full delineation of the
following federal rules see FED. R. EVID., 65 F.R.D. 144 (1974).
Rule 407-Subsequent Remedial Measures-this rule incorporates the traditional
doctrine excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures as proof of an admission of
fault. Thus exclusion is only called for where evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is offered as proof of negligence or other blameworthy conduct. See generally 2 J.
WIGMORE, WIGhMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 238 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
South Carolina follows rule 407. See Maus v. Pickens Sentinel Co., 258 S.C. 6, 186 S.E.2d
809 (1972) (in an action against a carrier for damage to a printing press damaged while
being unloaded from a truck, evidence was properly excluded that the shipper subse-
quently shipped another printing press to the Sentinel more substantially crated and
securely bolted down); Holman v. City of Orangeburg, 118 S.C. 361, 110 S.E. 674 (1922)
(rule recognized, but evidence of change in condition of sidewalk since accident admitted
not to prove an admission of fault by the defendant but to verify the time to which the
witness testified since all streets of the city had since been changed); Plunkett v. Clear-
water Bleachery & Mfg. Co., 80 S.C. 310, 318, 61 S.E. 431, 433 (1908) (Justice Jones,
dissenting in a case in which the court split, 2-2, on the issue of the admissibility of
evidence of repairs, remarked that "the question may be regarded as settled under the
case of Worthy v. Jonesville Oil Mill, 77 S.C. 73."). But see ME. R. EvI. 407, ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 14 (1975 Supp.), which did not adopt the federal rule or prior Maine law for the
reason that the public policy behind the rule - that to admit such evidence would deter
repairs - is unpersuasive today and that rule 403 still would allow the trial judge to
exclude such evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the dangers set forth there.
Rule 408-Compromise And Offers To Compromise-South Carolina is in accord
with the federal rule which establishes that evidence of an offer to compromise a claim is
not admissible as an admission of the validity or invalidity of the claim. See Hunter v.
Hyder, 236 S.C. 378, 114 S.E.2d 493 (1960); Neal v. Clark, 199 S.C. 316, 19 S.E.2d 473
(1942). Equally inadmissible are statements "made in the course of negotiations looking
to a compromise." Robertsori v. Blair, 56 S.C. 96, 104, 34 S.E. 11, 14 (1899). However,
under South Carolina case law an effort by an accused to "buy off" the prosecution or its
principal witness in a criminal case does not come within the rule's policy; hence such
offers are admitted. State v. Givens, 87 S.C. 525, 527, 70 S.E. 162, 162 (1911) (the rule
about offers to compromise "does not extend to criminal trials"); State v. Rucker, 86 S.C.
66, 68 S.E. 133 (1910).
Rule 409-Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses-South Carolina law corre-
sponds with the federal rule. See Howell v. Hairston, 261 S.C. 292, 199 S.E.2d 766 (1973)
(evidence that the defendant paid the plaintiffs $100 in partial payment of the medical
expenses incurred in the treatment of plaintiffs' son's eye should have been excluded). The
court in Howell also noted, however, that the rule would probably not be extended to
exclude evidence of conduct or statements not a part of the act of furnishing or offering
to pay. Id. at 299-300, 199 S.E.2d at 769. This accords with rule 409. As noted by the
Advisory Committee on the federal rules:
Contrary to Rule 408, dealing with offers of compromise, the present rule
does not extend to conduct or statements not a part of the act of furnishing or
offering or promising to pay. This difference in treatment arises from fundamen-
tal differences in nature. Communication is essential if compromises are to be
effected, and consequently broad protection of statements is needed. This is not
so in cases of payments or offers or promises to pay medical expenses, where
factual statements may be expected to be incidental in nature.
Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Evw. 409, 56 F.R.D. 228.
Rule 410-Offer to Plead Guilty; Nolo Contendere; Withdrawn Plea of
Guilty-this federal rule disallows the admission into evidence of withdrawn prior pleas
4
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judge in controlling the admission of evidence by determining
whether its probative value is outweighed by the harmful conse-
quences that might flow from its admission. The pertinent
consideration in this assessment is the tendency of the evidence
to produce unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading
the jury, undue delay or waste of time. Its unlimited terms make
this provision applicable "to all forms of evidence: direct and
circumstantial, testimonial, documentary, real proof and demon-
strations."" South Carolina apparently recognizes the rule ex-
cluding relevant evidence where its probative value is out-
weighed by these dangers In addition to those dangers set forth
of guilty or nolo contendere. There is no law in South Carolina on the admissibility of
withdrawn pleas of guilty, of nolos, or of offers of the same. One commentator has noted
that since the state policy on plea bargaining is generally the same as that in federal
courts, the rule should be applied, as well, to withdrawn pleas or offers to plead in state
criminal cases. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN's EvmENc, 410101], at 410-10
[hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]. Once a plea of guilty is made, however, it may there-
after be admissible under South Carolina law. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Foil, 189
S.C. 91, 200 S.E. 97 (1938).
Rule 411-Liability Insurance-generally, evidence of liability insurance is not
admissible under the federal rules. South Carolina law is in agreement. See Adams v. Orr,
260 S.C. 92, 194 S.E.2d 232 (1973); Crocker v. Weathers, 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335
(1962). Evidence of liability insurance is admissible in South Carolina courts when offered
for another purpose such as to prove the bias or prejudice of a witness. Powers v. Temple,
250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967). Some members of the South Carolina Bar are appar-
ently dissatisfied with the second sentence of federal rule 411. Voicing their opposition to
that sentence, the South Carolina chapter of the American College of Trial Lawyers stated
that the "less said about insurance the better." Report of the Committee of the South
Carolina Chapter of the American College of Trial Lawyers 4 (March 1970), cited in 2
WEINSTEIN 411[01], at 411-4 n.5.
7. FED. R. Evm. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
8. 1 WEINSTEIN 403[01], at 403-4 (footnote omitted).
9. Professor Dreher states that relevant evidence may be excluded where its probative
value is outweighed by certain dangers inherent in its admission: (1) undue arousal of jury
prejudice; (2) unreasonable consumption of time; (3) creation of side issues diverting the
jury's attention and (4) unfair surprise. J. DREHER, A Gum TO EVIDENCE LAw IN SouTH
CAROLINA 34 (1967) [hereinfter cited as DREHER].
Very few cases can be found to support this statement, probably because few cases
reach the appellate court on this issue since the trial judge's discretion in this area is quite
broad. See State v. Anderson, 253 S.C. 168, 169 S.E.2d 706 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
958, reh. denied, 397 U.S. 1031 (1970). See generally Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 124
S.E.2d 54 (1962) (recognizing the rule that undue prejudice is a ground for exclusion, but
holding the introduction of the "enucleated eye" of plaintiff-respondent to have been error
since defendant had admitted the loss of the eye and had therefore made that evidence
no longer relevant to any issue in the action).
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above, Professor Dreher lists unfair surprise as a danger which
may outweigh the probative value of relevant evidence."0 It is not
clear, however, that South Carolina does in fact recognize unfair
surprise as a ground for exclusion." Nevertheless, the better view
is the common law approach which states that unfair surprise,
standing alone, is not a ground for the exclusion of evidence.' 2
Although the trend of not recognizing unfair surprise alone as a
ground for exclusion is not without dispute,'3 South Carolina
should officially recognize, by judicial decision or legislative en-
actment, that exclusion is not the appropriate remedy:
While it can scarcely be doubted that claims of unfair surprise
may still be justified despite procedural requirements of notice
and instrumentalities of discovery, the granting of a continu-
ance is a more appropriate remedy than exclusion 'of the
evidence. 4
Modern day discovery practices and pretrial procedures in civil
There may be some question as to whether South Carolina would allow the process
of balancing prejudicial impact against the probative value of direct evidence and not
merely against the probative value of circumstantial evidence. See State v. Whitener, 228
S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701 (1955). While the value of direct evidence will not as easily be
outweighed by prejudicial impact as will circumstantial evidence, situations do arise
where undue prejudice can call for the exclusion of direct evidence. Professor Wigmore
noted one such situation by stating that the "rules requiring the exclusion of certain kinds
of witnesses whose personality might be supposed to carry undue weight with the jury and
thus to direct them from an impartial consideration of the evidence ... rest upon the
principle ... of undue prejudice." 6 WIMORE § 1906, at 576.
Along the lines of the foregoing, South Carolina recognizes the power of the court to
limit the number of witnesses in criminal cases. State v. Lee, 203 S.C. 536, 28 S.E.2d 402
(1943) (rule recognized and upheld). See also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185, at 439 n.30
(2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. Since the general rules of evidence are
the same in both criminal and civil cases, State v. Heavener, 146 S.C. 138, 143 S.E. 675
(1928), this rule should also be applicable to civil cases.
10. DREHER at 34.
11. While Professor Dreher lists unfair surprise as a ground for exclusion, he gives no
citation of authority for that statement. Id.
12. See 6 VIGMORE § 1849.
Surprise may often arise out of the offer of evidence strictly competent, and yet
that circumstance has never been considered as affecting the question of its
admissibility. Embarrassments of that sort, which are more or less incident to
every trial, are usually remedied by motion to the Court for a postponement of
the trial to a future day in the term or for a continuance.
United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 349 (1st Cir. Me. 1858) (No. 15, 381), quoted in 6
WIOMORE § 1845, at 374; accord, Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Evm. 403, 56 F.R.D.
218 (1972).
13. See 1 WEINSTEIN 403101], at 403-9 and nn. 8,9.
14. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Evm. 403 (emphasis added). See also note
12 supra.
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practice referred to above substantially reduce the possibility of
surprise; however, South Carolina criminal prosecutions are not
subject to the same liberal discovery rules as are present in the
federal courts. 5 Thus, the case for unfair surprise as a ground for
the exclusion of evidence in criminal cases would appear to be
stronger. Nevertheless, constitutional requirements of disclo-
sure," as well as the professional obligations of disclosure 7 which
the prosecution should recognize, should limit instances in which
unfair surprise could be claimed.
B. Character Evidence
1. Admissibility
Rule 40411 governs the admissibility of character evidence.
Generally, it provides that character evidence is not admissible
for the purpose of proving that a person acted in conformity with
the implications of that evidence except in those instances where
the character of an accused, a victim, or a witness is being used
for purposes of impeachment. South Carolina, for the most part,
follows these rules." Evidence of character in civil actions, how-
15. See 1 WEINSTEIN 403[01], at 403-11 and n.16. South Carolina's criminal discov-
ery devices are extremely limited. See W. LEDBErrER & W. MYERS, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN
SOUTH CAROLINA 50 (1970).
16. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
17. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmBnuY DR 7-103(B) & EC 7-13, adopted in
S.C. SuP. CT. R. 32 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
18. FED. R. Evw. 404 provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as pro-
vided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
19. Under South Carolina law an accused in a criminal case may introduce evidence
of a pertinent trait of his character which the prosecution may then rebut. State v. Gibert,
196 S.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 451 (1941). Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
7
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ever, is admissible in South Carolina in certain instances when
under the federal rule it would not be.
Rule 404 adopts the basic and orthodox rule of rejecting
character evidence in civil actions as a basis for inferring an act.
2
1
South Carolina apparently allows this type of evidence in some
cases where the conduct is criminal in nature, but not in others.2'
In Rogers v. Atlantic Life Insurance Co.,22 an action upon a con-
tract of life insurance where the defendant had raised the defense
of fraud on the part of the insured, the court held that it was
proper to admit testimony as to the "good character and honesty
of the deceased. 2 3 Some powerful reasoning in an earlier case
for violence similarly may be introduced. State v. Boyd, 126 S.C. 300, 119 S.E. 839 (1923).
This latter mode of proof cannot be done, however, by showing specific instances of
conduct. While evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
person acted in conformity therewith, it is admissible for other purposes. State v. Thomp-
son, 230 S.C. 473, 96 S.E.2d 471 (1957); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923)
(evidence of other crimes admissible to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or acci-
dent, a common scheme or plan embracing several crimes so related to each other that
proof of one tends to establish the others, and the identity of the person on trial charged
with the commission of the crime). For a discussion of the relevance of other criminal acts
in this context in South Carolina, see W. Reiser, Evidence of Other CriminalActs in South
Carolina, 28 S.C.L. REv. 125 (1976).
20. It should be noted that rule 404 does not prohibit the introduction of character
evidence in civil cases when not offered as a basis for inferring an act, such as (1) where
character is in issue, e.g., defamation, chastity of a victim where the crime is seduction,
wrongful death action on issue of damages; (2) where the evidence is offered to reflect
upon the credibility of a witness; (3) proving something other than that the defendant
acted in conformity with his character, e.g., negligence cases and the introduction of
evidence of other accidents to prove that the person was more likely to be at fault. See
generally 2 WEINSTEIN 404[03], at 404-18 to 404-19. South Carolina follows this view-
point where character is in issue. See Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S.C. 498, 172
S.E. 870 (1933) (plaintiff's reputed bad character admissible as mitigating damages in
action for malicious prosecution); Buford v. M'Luny, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 267
(1818) (plaintiff's reputed bad character admissible as mitigating damages for defama-
tion; it is not allowable "for instance where a person is accused of stealing, to prove by
way of mitigation that he had committed murder or that he was a drunkard or gambler;
but the evidence must go to show that his character is so bad that he might well be
suspected of the offense charged, and could not be injured by the report."); Leppard v.
Southern Ry., 174 S.C. 237, 177 S.E. 129 (1934) (recognizing the rule that character
evidence of the deceased in respect to his use of intoxicants is admissible on the issue of
damages in an action for wrongful death but holding that evidence of specific instances
of conduct is not admissible to show that deceased was addicted to the habitual use of
intoxicants).
21. Smoak v. Robinson, 156 S.C. 370, 153 S.E. 342 (1930) (batttery and trespass to
personality in a dispute over timber cutting, defendant's reputation "for peace, good order
and law abiding habits" excluded); Rogers v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 135 S.C. 89, 133 S.E.
215 (1926) (character evidence admissible where defense of fraud raised).
22. 135 S.C. 89, 133 S.E. 215 (1926).
23. Id. at 101, 133 S.E. at 221. See also Dawkins v. Gault, 39 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 153
(1851), where the court in alluding to an instance where character evidence in a civil case
8
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would suggest that this result should not have been obtained. 2
Nevertheless, it cannot be said with certainty that the admissibil-
ity of such evidence is not the better view.
The Advisory Committee on the federal rules derided the use
of such evidence because
[c]haracter evidence is of slight probative value and may be
very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the
main question of what actually happened on a particular occa-
sion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man
and to punish the bad man because of their respective charac-
ters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually hap-
pened.25
Wigmore, however, recognized that a blanket rule of exclusion of
character evidence in civil cases may not be justified. "[W]here
a moral interest is marked and prominent in the nature of the
issue, the defendant's good moral character should be received as
in criminal cases."26 Professor McCormick has noted that the
issue is a close one:
Should the same dispensation be accorded to the party in a civil
action [permitting him to introduce evidence of his good char-
acter] who has been charged by the adversary's pleading or
proof with a criminal offense involving moral turpitude? The
peril of judgment here is less, and most courts have declined to
is admissible to prove or disprove an act said: "Where an actual fraud is charged, perpe-
trated with a fraudulent intent, and the proof of the charge consists of the circumstances,
then, good character, as in a case of a crime, might be resorted to, as a circumstance to
prove innocence."
24. In Smet" v. Plunkett, 13 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 158 (1847), an action in assumpsit
where the defendant in set-off claimed a balance due from sales by the plaintiff, as
commission agent, which he had falsely suppressed, evidence of the plaintiff's good char-
acter was excluded on the basis that
[i]f, in every case where an act of dishonesty is imputed, the imputation may
be met by such evidence, then there are few cases into which such evidence
might not be introduced; trials would be insupportably tedious, and the result
of a trial would as often depend upon the popularity of a party, as upon the
merits of his case .... It is plain, that in civil cases, where the nature of the
action itself does not involve the general character of a party, evidence as to that
character cannot be offered to contradict an imputation of dishonesty, or even
of fraud.
Id. at 161.
25. Advisory Committee, Note to FED. R. EvID. 404, 56 F.R.D. 219, 221 (1972),
quoting CAL. LAW REvIsION COMM'N., TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STuDY RELATING
TO THE UNIFORM RuLS OF EVIDENCE 615 (1964).
26. 1 WIGMORE § 64, at 478-80.
19771
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pay the price in consumption of time and distraction from the
issue which the concession entails. A growing minority, however,
has been impressed with the serious consequences to the party's
standing, reputation, and relationships which such a charge,
even in a civil action, may bring in its train, and has followed
the criminal analogy, by permitting the party to introduce evi-
dence of his good reputation for the trait involved in the charge.
The balance of expediency is a close one.
2
1
Ultimately, the decision of whether to allow the admission
of character evidence in civil actions as a basis for inferring an
act is largely one of preference depending upon which faction the
court chooses to follow. It should, nevertheless, be consistent in
either allowing or denying the admission of such evidence.2 To
this end, a rule of evidence either adopting or rejecting the view
taken by the federal rules should be adopted.
2. Methods of Proof
Three methods of proof of character are provided for in rule
405:21 (1) by testimony as to reputation, (2) by testimony in the
form of opinion or (3) where character is "in issue," by evidence
of specific instances of conduct. South Carolina allows the proof
of character by testimony as to reputation or by evidence of spe-
cific instances of conduct when character is a material, conse-
quential fact."0 Specific instances of conduct may also be brought
out on cross-examination.3 1 In contrast to rule 405, testimony in
27. MCCORMICK § 192, at 459-60 (footnotes omitted).
28. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
29. FED. R. Evir. 405 provides:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or
a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony
as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait
of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense,
proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct.
30. State v. Outen, 237 S.C. 514, 118 S.E.2d 175, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961)
(testimony as to reputation to prove character allowed); Buford v. M'Luny, 10 S.C.L. (1
Nott & McC.) 267 (1818) (specific act admissible where character in issue in certain
instances). For examples of instances where character is "in issue," see note 20 supra.
31. State v. Lyles, 210 S.C. 87, 41 S.E.2d 625 (1947) (a witness may be asked about
particular acts or crimes imputed to the accused involving traits of character which the
accused has put in issue). The same rule applies with equal force to the cross-examination
of the defendant. State v. Gibert, 196 S.C. 306, 310, 13 S.E.2d 451, 453-54 (1941) ("where
the accused in a criminal case voluntarily puts his good character in evidence, and has
[Vol. 28
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the form of opinion to prove character is not allowed in South
Carolina.2
The genesis of the rule against allowing testimony founded
exclusively upon personal knowledge, requiring the question at
least in form to be directed to reputation alone appears to be in
a statement made in an old English decision3 3 which was subse-
quently misread.34 The result has been the development of a tech-
nique whereby a witness is asked if he knows the reputation of
the person whose character is in question, and if the answer is in
the affirmative, a further inquiry is made as to whether that
reputation is good or bad. 5 The limitation on the use of opinion
testimony to prove character has apparently been grounded upon
the notion that, since cross-examination may probe into the
grounds for that opinion, the allowance of "opinion from observa-
tion would provoke distracting side-issues over disputes about
specific conduct of the [person] attacked. ' 3 Wigmore presents
the contrary argument in powerful fashion:
Take the place of a juryman, and speculate whether he is helped
more by the witnesses whose personal intimacy gives to their
belief a first and highest value, or by those who merely repeat a
form of words in which the term "reputation" occurs. . . .The
Anglo-American rules of evidence have occasionally taken some
curious twistings in the course of their development; but they
have never done anything so curious in the way of shutting out
evidential light as when they decided to exclude the person who
knows as much as humanly can be known about the character
of another, and have still admitted the secondhand, irresponsi-
ble product of multiplied guesses and gossip which we term
"reputation. 3
The Advisory Committee aptly noted that reputation evi-
dence has persisted "due to its largely being opinion in dis-
made it one of the issues of the case, he may be cross-examined as to particular acts or
conduct derogatory to his good character, but such examination must be confined to the
nature of the charge against him.").
32. State v. Logue, 204 S.C. 171, 28 S.E.2d 788 (1944); Chapman v. Cooley, 46 S.C.L.
(12 Rich.) 654, 661 (1860) (the belief of the community, and not of the individual testi-
fying").
33. Rex v. Jones, 31 Howells St. Tr. 251, 310 (1809) ("It is reputation; it is not what
a person knows.").
34. 7 WIGMORE § 1981, at 146.
35. State v. Outen, 237 S.C. 514, 118 S.E.2d 175, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961).
36. MCCORMICK § 44, at 94-95.
37. 7 WIGMORE § 1986, at 166-67.
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guise."" The use of direct opinion evidence is desirable since it
would supplant the use of indirect fictions where the witness, in
testifying as to another's general reputation, is undoubtedly ex-
pressing his personal opinion as well. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court has apparently recognized, although inadvertently,
that testimony as to reputation is in fact testimony of the opinion
of the community in disguise or, undisguised, an opinion of the
opinion of "those persons who have had the opportunity, through
social or business contact, to form an opinion of the character of
the person. . . under inquiry."39 More forceful argument has not
been made to unveil this disguise than that by Barrister Taylor,
arguing in Regina v. Rowton,40 when he observed that
[rieputation is only the repetition of the judgment of oth-
ers. . . There is no rule of law that, to make evidence of repu-
tation admissible, it must be founded on the judgment of a
definite number. If, then, the judgment of ten or a less number
of men is admissible under the name of reputation, how can the
judgment of one only, that is, how can the estimate of disposi-
tion formed by one man only, or, in other words, individual
opinion, be excluded[?]4'
Since opinion evidence is actually admitted under present
practice in the form of testimony as to reputation, and since in
fact opinion evidence is probably more reliable in proving
character than is evidence as to reputation, it would be desirable
if South Carolina's rule as to proof of character be revised' to
conform with Federal Rule of Evidence 405. Admission of opinion
evidence would eliminate the anomalous and inconsistent situa-
tion created under South Carolina's present evidentiary rule.
C. Habit or Custom
Rule 406,42 contrasted with the admission of character evi-
dence in rule 404, allows the admission of evidence of habit or
38. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Evm. 405, 56 F.R.D. 222 (1972).
39. In re Greenfield's Estate, 245 S.C. 595, 603, 141 S.E.2d 916, 920 (1965).
40. 169 Eng. Rep. 1497 (Ct. Crim. App. 1865).
41. Id. at 1501, quoted in 7 WIGMORE § 1986, at 167 n.5.
42. FED. R. EVID. 406 provides:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organiza-
tion, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eye witnesses,
is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular
occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
[Vol. 28
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss4/5
routine practice as relevant to prove that an act was conducted
in conformity therewith. This is in accord with an almost
"universally" accepted practice43 and is based upon the view that
the probative value of evidence of habit is much greater than that
of character.4 South Carolina follows the federal rule on admit-
ting evidence of habit45 except that one case seems to suggest that
evidence of habit to prove conduct is only admissible where there
were no eyewitnesses to the occasion.
In Holcombe v. Watson Supply Co.,4" an action was brought
for the death of one fatally injured by the alleged negligence of
the defendant's servant in striking the deceased while he was
attempting to cross a street. The trial court refused to allow the
testimony of defendant's witness which was offered to show that
the deceased habitually walked "more in the road than. . . [on]
the side of the road. 4 7 The supreme court correctly held that this
evidence was not relevant since the accident occurred at a pedes-
trian crosswalk in the City of Greenville. The court, nevertheless,
in some unfortunate dicta went on to discuss the issue of whether
eyewitnesses should be absent in order that the evidence of habit
be admissible. Quoting from an old treatise, the court stated that
"the weight of authority seems to be against admitting evidence
of general conduct under proven circumstances to show conduct
of the same kind under similar circumstances on a particular
occasion, when there were eyewitnesses of the occurrence."4
Therefore, it is unclear in view of the dicta in Holcombe, the age
of the case, and the general status of the law today49 whether the
South Carolina court would only allow evidence of habit when
there are no eyewitnesses to the occasion.
Clearly, the better reasoned view is that taken by rule 406
43. 1 WIGMORE § 93, at 520.
44. MCCORMICK § 195, at 463.
45. See State v. Phillips, 194 S.C. 46, 9 S.E.2d 32 (1940) (prosecution for unlawfully
storing unstamped liquors; other similar violations of the law admitted for the purpose of
showing habit); State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885 (1926) (prosecution for murder
of storekeeper on leaving his store; his habit of taking money home from store admitted).
46. 171 S.C. 110, 171 S.E. 604 (1933).
47. Id. at 116, 171 S.E. at 606.
48. Id. at 117, 171 S.E. at 606 (quoting 10 R.C.L. at 955).
49. The court in Holcombe placed reliance upon an earlier California decision, Wallis
v. Southern Pacific Co., 184 Cal. 662, 195 P. 408 (1921). 17 S.C. at 117, 171 S.E. at 606.
This decision is no longer authority for that proposition since § 1105 of the California
Evidence Code eliminates the preexisting eyewitness rule by implication. See 2 WEINSTEIN
406[02], at 406-10 to 406-11 n.3. See also note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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admitting evidence of habit "regardless of the presence of eyewit-
nesses." The need for the particular evidence of habit sought to
be admitted seems to be equally as great where the eyewitnesses
disagree or where the issue of fact is otherwise doubtful, as where
the absence of eyewitnesses produces the trouble. As noted by the
California Law Revision commission in commenting on a section
of the California Evidence Code which, by implication, removes
the eyewitness rule:
The no eyewitness' limitation is undesirable. Eyewitnesses fre-
quently are mistaken, and some are dishonest. The trier of fact
should be entitled to weigh the habit evidence against the eye-
witness testimony as well as all of the other evidence in the
case."0
A related problem to the eyewitness rule in South Carolina
is the tendency of the courts to confuse the distinction between
character and habit evidence. This results in the expression of
habitual conduct as character, e.g., "habit of carelessness,"
thereby rendering it inadmissible. Professor McCormick states
that the eyewitness rule is probably a product of this "failure to
draw a clear line between character and habit."' 5' By understand-
ing the distinction between character and habit and by correctly
applying the two rules, courts can limit the admission of evidence
to specific habits which are far more probative and less
prejudicial than character. Probably the best, certainly the most
often quoted, contrast of character with habit has been that of
Professor McCormick:
Character and habit are close akin. Character is a generalized
description of one's disposition, or of one's disposition in respect
to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance or peacefulness.
"Habit" in modern usage, both lay and psychological, is more
specific. It describes one's regular response to a repeated specific
situation. If we speak of character for care, we think of a person's
tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life, in
business, family life, in handling automobiles and in walking
across the street. A habit, on the other hand, is the person's
regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a
specific type of conduct, such as the habit of going down a
particular stair way two stairs at a time, or of giving the hand
50. Comment-Law Revision Comm'n, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1105 (West 1968) (empha-
sis added).
51. McCORMICK § 195, at 464.
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14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss4/5
19771 EVIDENCE
signal for a left turn, or of alighting from railway cars while they
are moving.52
A good example of this confusion can be found in
Bedenbaugh v. Southern Railway" where the court correctly held
that the individual's character as a heavy drinker was not admis-
sible to show that he was not sober on a given occasion. Unfortun-
ately, the court incorrectly labeled the issue as whether his "habit
of drinking" was so admissible. 4
South Carolina should officially clarify this area by judicial
decision or legislative enactment and dispense with the apparent
requirement that no eyewitnesses be available before evidence of
habit will be admitted. By doing away with this unsound require-
ment, the trial judge will no longer be able to exclude evidence
on the grounds that an eyewitness is present, thereby evading its
categorization as character or habit. Thus, the must needed clari-
fication of the difference between character evidence and habit
evidence will be aided by forcing the trial judge to categorize the
evidence to determine its admissibility in addition to allowing the
trier of fact to weigh all the evidence including the habit evidence
and testimony of any eyewitnesses.
52. Id. at 462-63 (footnote omitted). The difference between character and habit
evidence is also well explained by the Advisor's Note to ME. R. Evm. 404, ME. REv. STAT.
tit. 14 (1975 Supp.):
Rule 404 states the general rule that evidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Why should habit be treated
differently? The rationale is that habit describes one's regular response to a
repeated specific situation so that doing the habitual act becomes semi-
automatic. It is the notion of the invariable regularity that gives habit evidence
its probative force. Evidence that one is a "careful man" or a "careful driver"
is inadmissible as lacking the specificity of an act becoming semi-automatic; it
goes to character rather than habit.
53. 69 S.C. 1, 48 S.E. 53 (1903).
54. Id. at 16, 48 S.E. at 58 (emphasis added). As noted by Professor Wigmore, courts
have frequently used the term "habits of intemperance" to signify "frequent indulgences,
and not constant or periodical intoxication." 1 WIGMORE § 96, at 529. Used in this sense
the term denotes a general disposition for excessive drinking which is evidence of character
and not admissible. If it is used in the sense of a specific habit of drinking at regular times
and in a regular manner, e.g., drinking a certain number of glasses of whiskey every day
upon arriving home from work, then it is evidence of habit and it should be admissible.
Admittedly, the distinction is superficially a fine one; it, nevertheless, reflects the true
meaning of habit as opposed to character. The courts, however, have used the term
"habit" loosely, and as a consequence, "the judicial applications of the principle are by
no means uniform." Id. (footnote omitted).
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III. WITNESSES
A. Rules of Competency55
Federal Rules 601,11 605 5 and 60611 are general rules of com-
55. Because they are not materially different from the prevailing law in South Caro-
lina, the following federal rules do not merit textual discussion. Rule 602-Lack of Per-
sonal Knowledge; accord, Wilson v. Clary, 212 S.C. 250, 47 S.E.2d 618 (1948). Rule
603-Oath or Affirmation; accord, State v. Hicks, 257 S.C. 279, 185 S.E.2d 746 (1971).
Rule 604-Interpreters; cf. Peoples' Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. Manos Bros., 226 S.C.
257, 84 S.E.2d 857 (1954). Rule 605-Competency of Judge as Witness; accord, State v.
Bagwell, 201 S.C. 387, 23 S.E.2d 244 (1942). Rule 606-Competency of Juror as Witness,
paragraph (a); contra, State v. Vari, 35 S.C. 175, 14 S.E. 392 (1892) (no error committed
where juror called only to testify to an isolated particular matter); Rule 606, paragraph
(b); see Barsh v. Chrysler Corp., 262 S.C. 129, 203 S.E.2d 107 (1974) (testimony of juror
will not be received oil the hearing of a motion to set aside a verdict on the ground of
mistake, irregularity or misconduct on the part of the jury or some one or more of the
panel); but see Cohen v. Robert, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 410 (1848) (juror's affidavit of alleged
misconduct by party to the action admissible; new trial granted). Rule 608-Evidence of
Character and Conduct of Witness, paragraph (a)(1); cf. State v. Robertson, 26 S.C.
117, 1 S.E. 443 (1887) (evidence of witness' character for "truth and veracity"); Rule 608,
paragraph (b); see Daniel v. Hazel, 242 S.C. 443, 131 S.E.2d 260 (1963); State v. William-
son, 65 S.C. 242, 43 S.E. 671 (1903) (testimony by accused does not operate as a waiver
of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters relating
only to credibility); State v. Merrimam, 34 S.C. 16, 12 S.E. 619 (1891). Rule
610-Religious Belief or Opinion; see State v. Hicks, 257 S.C. 279, 185 S.E.2d 746 (1971).
Rule 611-Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation, paragraphs (a) and
(e); accord, State v. Cook, 204 S.C. 295, 28 S.E.2d 842 (1944) (leading questions on direct
examination); State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E.2d 72 (1940) (leading questions on cross
and direct examination of hostile witness). Rule 612-Writing Used to Refresh Memory;
accord, State v. Collins, 15 S.C. 373 (1881). Rule 614-Calling and Interrogation of
Witnesses by Court; accord, Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 99 S.E.2d 384
(1957); State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 88 S.E.2d 880 (1955).
56. FED. R. EVID. 601 provides:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.
57. FED. R. EVID. 605 provides:
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness.
No objection need be made in order to preserve the point.
58. FED. R. EvID. 606 provides:
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before
that jury in the trial of the case in which he is sitting as a juror. If he is called
so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out
of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into
the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter
or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing
him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
16
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petency. The second sentence of rule 601, however, creates two
standards of competency that will apply in all federal courts." If
state law supplies the rule of decision, as in civil cases where
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, then state limita-
tions on competency of witnesses must be applied. In criminal
cases, and in certain civil cases where state law does not supply
the rule of decision, rule 601 grants automatic competence to
every person to testify as a witness unless that person is a member
of the jury that is hearing the case,60 or is the presiding judge,'
or refuses to testify truthfully. 2 In federal litigation rule 601 dis-
penses with the necessity of examining a witness as to his or her
competence to testify. As one commentator has observed, the
effect of rule 601 has been to "convert questions of competence
into questions of credibility while steadily moving towards a reali-
zation that judicial determination of the question of whether a
witness should be heard at all should be abrogated in favor of
hearing the testimony for what it's worth.
'6 3
Several explanations have been advanced as to why Congress
added the second sentence to rule 601: (1) the fear that the origi-
nal draft, granting automatic competence to witnesses in all
cases, would lead to forum shopping;64 (2) the Supreme Court is
prohibited from promulgating rules which might "abridge, en-
large, or modify any substantive right"; 5 and (3) the Erie doc-
trine compels a federal court to apply substantive state law.66
Whatever the legalistic rationale for the second sentence to rule
601, the legislative history clearly indicates that it was primarily
a result of the congressional desire to respect the diverse applica-
tion of the so-called Dead Man's Statutes among the states.
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought
to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by
him concerning a matter about what he would be precluded from testifying be
received for these purposes.
59. See generally 3 WEINSTEIN 601[03].
60. FED. R. EvI. 606.
61. FED. R. Evm. 605.
62. FED. R. Evm. 603 provides:
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to
awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.
63. 3 WEINSTEIN 601[05], at 601-35 (footnote omitted).
64. See Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1973).
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1972).
66. See 3 WEINSTEIN 601102], at 601-11.
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1. Dead Man's Rule
Section 26-402 of the South Carolina Code is the statutory
embodiment of the dead man's rule in South Carolina." The dead
man's rule in South Carolina operates to disqualify as a witness
any party to an action, or any person who has an interest which
may be affected by such action, or any person who previously had
an interest in such action, who purports to testify with regard to
any "transaction or communication" between such witness and
a person now "deceased, insane or lunatic" represented by an
executor, administrator, or heir-at-law, etc., when such testi-
mony could affect the interest of such witness." Admittedly, sec-
tion 26-402 restricts the general provision of section 26-404 which
states that a witness is not to be disqualified because of an inter-
est, of whatever nature, in the outcome of the litigation." It is,
therefore, a perpetuation in limited form of the discredited com-
mon law rule which disqualified a witness from testifying because
of interest.7"
The courts of this state, however, have strictly construed the
rule and have endeavored to limit its applicability to cases which
clearly fall within its intended scope. 7' The ban of the statute is
aimed at the witness, not at the transaction or communication;
therefore, the transaction can be proved, but not by one of the
interested persons designated in section 26-402.11 A witness can
escape the disqualification, however, by renouncing or disclaim-
ing, in good faith, any interest which he or she might have in the
outcome of the litigation.73 Moreover, if the party defending the
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-402 (1962).
68. Id.
69. Ropley v. Klugh, 40 S.C. 134, 18 S.E. 680 (1893); Jones v. Pluncknett, 9 S.C. 392
(1877); Guery v. Kinsler, 3 S.C. 423 (1872).
70. See Long v. Conroy, 246 S.C. 225, 143 S.E.2d 459 (1965).
71. See Hicks v. Battey, 259 S.C. 426, 192 S.E.2d 477 (1972); Respass & Respass,
C.P.A. v. King Pontiac, 236 S.C. 363, 114 S.E.2d 486 (1960); Lisinby v. Newsome, 234
S.C. 237, 107 S.E.2d 449 (1959). See Evidence, 1972 Survey of South Carolina Law, 25
S.C.L. REV. 378, 389 (1973).
72. The transaction can be proved, but not by:
(1) a party to the action;
(2) a person having an interest which may be affected by the outcome of the
action;
(3) a person who has had such an interest which has come to a party to the
action; or
(4) an assignor of anything in controversy in the action.
The above categories of disqualified persons are enumerated in Norris v. Clinkscales, 47
S.C. 488, 25 S.E. 797 (1896).
73. Long v. Conroy, 246 S.C. 225, 143 S.E.2d 459 (1965).
[Vol. 28
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interest of the deceased in the action "opens the door" by testi-
mony concerning the transaction, then any other witness is com-
petent to testify with respect thereto.74
Although the rule is in "bad repute" with modern writers, it
nevertheless continues to survive as an acknowledged anomaly in
American jurisprudence. The vitality of the rule may be a func-
tion of "the failure of reformers to appreciate its substantive im-
plications."75 This failure can be better understood by considering
the various ways in which dead man's statutes may be viewed.
They could be characterized as a truth seeking device designed
to discourage perjury by the surviving claimant.71 On the other
hand they might be viewed as a rule designed to protect a dece-
dent's estate from survivors since the deceased cannot confront
the survivor. 77 The rule has been justified in South Carolina on
the "principle that it is against public policy to allow a witness
thus interested to testify as to such matters when such testimony,
if untrue, cannot be contradicted.
'78
The criticisms of the dead man's statute have been persistent
and scathing. Bentham labeled the statute a "blind and brain-
less" technique that resulted in greater injustice than it sought
to prevent.7 1 Professor Morgan, reporter for the Model Code of
Evidence, condemned such statutes on the basis that they are
"fertile breeders of litigation, and most of them, while preventing
the enforcement of many honest claims, are ineffective to prevent
perjury by witnesses whose interest does not fall within the statu-
tory ban.""0 Professor Wigmore, characterizing the rule as a
"crude, technical, and unjust method of disqualifying wit-
nesses,"81 advanced several objections to such statutes that apply
equally well to the common law "interest" disqualification:
(1) the supposed danger of interested persons testifying falsely
exists to a limited extent only;
(2) and, so far as they testify truly, their exclusion is an intol-
erable injustice;
74. Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S.C. 488, 25 S.E. 797 (1896).
75. 2 WIGMORE § 578. Professor Wigmore refers to the rule as a "crude, technical, and
unjust method of disqualifying witnesses." Id. at 697. See also McCoRMIcK § 65.
76. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 365 (1969).
77. Id.
78. Trimmier v. Thomson, 41 S.C. 125, 130, 19 S.E. 291, 294 (1894).
79. McCoRMICK § 65, at 143.
80. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 93-94 (1962).
81. See note 75 supra.
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(3) no exclusion can be so defined as to be rational, consistent,
and workable;
(4) in any case, the test of cross-examination, and other safe-
guards for truth are a sufficient guaranty against frequent false
decision. 2
The fallacies in the reasoning underlying the dead man's rule
are manifold.13 Fundamentally, it is based on a mistaken view of
human experience, a view that dishonest men outnumber honest
men and that self-interest is inevitably accompanied by falsifica-
tion. In their attempt to further truth-seeking, dead man's
statutes actually serve to impede the search for the truth by
denying the jury substantial parts of relevant evidence bearing on
the issue at hand. Such statutes create "intolerable injustices" by
prohibiting the proof of honest claims and defenses, thereby
working a "certain injustice" to one side in the name of obviating
a potential injustice to the other. Furthermore, the dead man's
rule fails to consider the ability of judge and jury to weigh the
probative value of the evidence in separating truth from false-
hood. It also neglects the value of cross-examination in exposing
deception.
In South Carolina, as well as in other states, the rule has led
to a veritable maze of decisions, most of which tend to exacerbate
the confusion and vagaries that already mystify lawyers and
judges in applying and interpreting the rule. Nor do the argu-
ments and justifications in support of the rule appear to satisfac-
torily answer the question, first put by Wigmore, of why the law
should decide it more important to save dead men's estates from
false claims than to save living men's estates from loss by lack of
proof?
Since rule 601 does not eliminate those grounds of incompe-
tency prescribed by State law when State law provides the rule
of decision, both federal and state courts in South Carolina must
operate within the evidentiary limits prescribed by section 26-
402 of the South Carolina Code of Laws84 whenever the case
before them is one governed by South Carolina law. Although
abolition of the rule has long been sought, its death has been slow
in coming. If the legislature is unwilling to repeal the statute,
82. 2 WIaMORE § 578, at 696.
83. See generally Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 105-09 (1963).
84. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-402 (1962).
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then the courts should continue to give the statute the narrowest
possible application, as in probate cases, for example, where the
substantive aspect of the rule would clearly predominate.
8 5
2. Husband-Wife
In Barr's Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc."8 the South Carolina
Supreme Court applied the rule, first espoused in 1777 by Lord
Mansfield, that a husband and wife are incompetent to testify as
to nonaccess between them in any case where the question of the
legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is at issue. In other words,
neither spouse is considered competent to testify as to the fact of
the lack of opportunity for intercourse with the other spouse so
as to bastaridze a child that was born in wedlock. According to
Professor Dreher, the rule arises from the "strongest of presump-
tions, that of legitimacy.
'87
The justification for the rule has been consistently phrased
in the same vague and mystifying terms first advanced by Lord
Mansfield:
It is a rule founded in decency, morality and policy, that they
shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they have had
no connection and therefore that the offspring is spurious.8
Although relevant South Carolina cases have offered little in the
way of justifying or rationalizing the rule, it has been suggested
by other courts that such a rule: (1) operates to preserve the
matrimonial relation, (2) inhibits the "disastrous consequences"
that would accompany the unsettling of property titles, (3) pro-
tects the innocent child from being branded illegitimate, (4) les-
sens the "public charges" that society must support, and (5) en-
hances the "peace and quiet" of the family, community, and
society.
85. 3 WEINSTEIN 601[03], at 601-20.
86. 220 S.C. 447, 68 S.E.2d 440 (1951).
87. DREHER at 25.
88. Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 291, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777), quoted in MCCORMrIICK
§ 67, at 146. In 1874, Justice Gordon of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
Admission of such testimony would be unseemly and scandalous; and this, not
so much from the fact that it reveals immoral conduct upon part of the parents,
as because of the effect it may have upon the child; who is in no fault, but who
must nevertheless be the chief sufferer thereby. That the parents should be
permitted to bastardize the child is a proposition which shocks our sense of right
and decency.
Tioga v. South Creek, 75 Pa. 433-37 (1874).
89. Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937).
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Wigmore has accurately described the rule as "inconsistent,
obstructive and pharisaical"." Indeed, upon close analysis the
proffered justifications for this curious rule prove to be spurious
and illusory. To begin with, a married woman can certainly tes-
tify that she has lived in adultery, and yet the rule renders her
incompetent to testify that her husband had no access to her
during the time when the child was conceived. Why is the latter
testimony indecent and not the former? Nor is it clear how the
matrimonial relation will be preserved by allowing the testimony
as to her adultery but not as to her nonaccess to the husband. The
"protection of the matrimonial relation" justification is also
shown to be fallacious when one considers the fact that a husband
and wife are competent to testify to the fact of nonaccess when
the legitimacy of a child is not in question.
With respect to the immorality of bastardizing one's issue,
courts fail to recognize that parents can prove illegitimacy in
other ways, e.g., by testimony that the child was born out of
wedlock, or that one spouse was married to a third person at the
time or that there was no legal marriage in existence. Thus it
seems a patent inconsistency for the law to deny the bastardiza-
tion of an issue in one way-having testimony by spouses as to
nonaccess-and permitting the same result to be accomplished in
many other ways.'
The "security of titles to property" argument appears to beg
the question since the titles to property are always unsettled
when they depend on the legitimacy of a claimant to the property
and the question of that legitimacy is brought before a court.
Furthermore, it makes little sense to deny a jury the benefit of
evidence from those most likely to know the true facts surround-
ing the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claimant.
The "cost to society of supporting illegitimate children" and
the "peace and quiet to society" arguments appear to be merely
different verbal formulations of the moral and public policy ra-
tionales expressed by Lord Mansfield. Even assuming the relev-
ance of such arguments, they would appear to be negatived by the
equally valid claim of protecting an innocent husband from pay-
ing for the care and support of a child that he did not father.
Professor Wigmore's scathing indictment should represent
the rule's death knell:
90. 7 WIGMORE § 2064, at 369.
91. Id. at 368 n.2.
[Vol. 28
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The truth is that these high-sounding "decencies" and
"moralities" are mere pharisaical afterthoughts, invented to
explain a rule otherwise incomprehensible, and lacking support
in the established facts and policies of our law 2
As noted earlier, rule 601, when applied in cases in which
federal law supplies the rule of decision, grants automatic compe-
tency to every person, except as otherwise provided in those rules.
This clearly represents the most reasonable approach in any sys-
tem that seeks to maximize the availability of evidence in the
pursuit of truth. Accordingly, South Carolina's nonaccess rule of
exclusion should be legislatively or judicially annulled and testi-
mony relating to nonaccess between husband and wife admitted
for what it is worth.
B. Who May Impeach?
The traditional rule that a party may not impeach its own
witness is officially abrogated in federal courts by rule 607. 11 Most
courts have already rejected the concept that a party calling a
witness vouches for his or her credibility,94 and the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Chambers v. Mississippi9 5 probably
compels that result in criminal cases.
South Carolina, on the other hand, apparently still adheres
to the orthodox rule.9" There are, however, certain judicially cre-
ated exceptions to the rule that a witness cannot be impeached
by the party at whose instance he testifies. In State v. Richburg97
92. Id. at 369.
93. FED. R. EVID. 607 provides: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him."
94. See 3 WENSTEiN 607[01], at 607 n.1.
95. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
96. See State v. Richburg, 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968); Gilfillan v. Gilfihlan,
242 S.C. 258, 130 S.E.2d 578 (1963); Squires v. Henderson, 208 S.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 738
(1946); State v. Russ, 208 S.C. 449, 38 S.E.2d 385 (1946); State v. Kennedy, 85 S.C. 146,
67 S.E. 152 (1909); State v. Waldrop, 73 S.C. 60, 52 S.E. 793 (1905).
South Carolina does recognize, however, a limited exception to the orthodox rule. In
White v. Southern Oil Stores, 198 S.C. 173, 17 S.E.2d 150 (1941), the supreme court held
that where the witness is not of the party's own selection, but is one whom the law obliges
him to call, such as a subscribing witness to a deed or will, then the offering party is
permitted to impeach or discredit the witness. See also Williams v. Walker, 18 S.C. Eq.
(2 Rich. Eq.) 291 (1846) (where a party, in order to make out his title, is compelled by
the rules of evidence to call the subscribing witness to an instrument and his testimony
tends to invalidate the instrument, the party calling him may impeach his credibility).
State v. Hughey, 214 S.C. 111, 51 S.E.2d 376 (1949) (the trial court has broad discretion
to allow the party calling a hostile witness to cross-examine him).
97. 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968).
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the supreme court announced that counsel offering a witness will
not be permitted to introduce prior inconsistent statements
against that witness in order to impeach the testimony98 unless
the offering counsel can demonstrate both substantial surprise
and injury by the witness' testimony. Thus, if the witness merely
fails to remember or refuses to answer, the prior statement cannot
be used against him by the offering counsel since there has been
no positive harm from the mere failure to give favorable testi-
mony." Similarly, if the turncoat witness should inform counsel
beforehand that he intends to recant his former story, counsel
cannot claim surprise and offer the previous statements.00
There are essentially three reasons offered in support of the
orthodox rule:
(1) the party calling the witness guarantees his trustworthi-
ness;
(2) if impeaching one's own witness were allowed, then the
witness could be "blackmailed" into testifying favorably, and
perhaps falsely, for the party calling him; and
(3) the fear that a jury may accept the impeaching evidence
as substantive proof.'
These apparent justifications, however, have been met by con-
vincing rebuttals by leading commentators.
With respect to the first reason, it is obvious that in reality
a party has "little or no choice of witnesses" and, except as to
character or expert witnesses, merely calls those who happened
to "observe the partcular facts in controversy.' ' 2 As to the second
reason, Professor McCormick has succinctly noted "(a) that it
applies only to two kinds of impeachment, the attack on charac-
ter and the showing of corruption, and (b) that to forbid the
attack by the calling party leaves the party at the mercy of the
witness and his adversary."'0 3
As for the third ground supporting the orthodox rule, it is
worth quoting, at some length, Dean Ladd's reply:
98. A fortiori, such statements cannot be introduced as substantive evidence of its
truth. But see FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1).
99. MCCORMICK § 76.
100. DREHER at 16 (citing State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E.2d 72 (1940)).
101. Federal Rule 801(d)(1) permits previous contradictory statements to be used as
substantive evidence-not merely for impeachment-if made under oath. FED. R. Evmn.
801(d)(1).
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First, the application of this theory is inconsistent with the ac-
cepted doctrine that a counsel may obtain an admission from
his own witness that he has made contradictory statements. In
case a party shows that he is surprised by the unfavorable testi-
mony, he may make inquiry of his witness concerning prior
statements to refresh his memory, to probe his conscience, and
to permit him to explain his divergencies if he admits them. If
the witness admits making the former statement but maintains
that it is not correct, the statement is nevertheless before the
jury just as the impeachment statement would be. The danger
of receiving the contradition as proof would be the same as if
other witnesses proved the former statement.
Second, the inconsistent application of this reason point-
edly appears in connection with impeachment of witnesses of an
adversary. The identical chance of misuse of impeaching state-
ments exists where the witness has damaged the opponent. Yet
in the latter case prior inconsistent statements are universally
admitted without fear that the triers may accept the impeach-
ing statements as substantive evidence.
Third,. . . the fact that the witness is present in court,
sworn upon oath, and subjected to cross-examination of the ad-
verse party, substantially eliminates the opportunity for error or
misjudgement in receiving the former statement. . . .If there
is not real danger, even assuming the jury were to accept the
prior inconsistent statements as proof, that reason for the rule
can not be urged where there is a legitimate basis of admitting
the statements for impeachment purposes.2 4
In addition to the "substantial surprise" and "injury" re-
strictions, another South Carolina case has concluded that the
adversary counsel cannot waive the rule that bars impeaching
one's own witness."°5 This conclusion was based on the rationale
that the rule barring impeachment of one's own witness is "for
the protection of the witness" and, therefore, cannot be waived
by anyone except the witness himself."' In the words of Professor
Dreher, however, "[W]hy should any witness be protected
against a legitimate effort to make him tell the truth as to a non-
privileged matter?"'' 7
104. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. CM. L.
REv. 69, 87-88 (1936).
105. Farr v. Thompson, 155 S.C. Eq. (Chev. Eq.) 37 (1839).
106. Id.
107. DREHER at 16.
1977]
25
Chandler and Runyan: The New Federal Rules of Evidence and South Carolina Evidentiary
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The federal rule has made the most reasonable choice: com-
plete abrogation of the orthodox rule. The Advisory Committee's
note to rule 607 recited the "false premises" on which the rule is
based, as well as the fact that the continued erosion of support
for the rule as evidenced by judicial opinions and statutes serves
to heighten the doubts as to the soundness and workability of the
rule. '"' And finally, as Professor McCormick observed, a "rule
against the showing of the prior statements of one's own witness,
to aid in evaluating his testimony, is a serious obstruction to the
ascertainment of truth."'' South Carolina would do well to aban-
don this anachronistic and unworkable rule. '
It should be pointed out, however, that the harshness of the
orthodox rule can be avoided in certain situations. For example,
South Carolina has a procedure, similar to that specified in fed-
eral rule 614(a),'" where a trial judge has the right on his own
motion to call a witness, as a witness of the court."2 Thus, by
exercising this power, the witness could be offered for cross-
examination by both sides, and previous statements could be
produced for impeachment purposes. As Professor Dreher noted,
a witness might be expected to "stick to the truth" if he thought
that recanting his story would result in previous statements being
introduced against him."3
One other method, noted by Professor McCormick, for avoid-
ing the rule prohibiting impeachment of one's own witness is for
the calling party to question the turncoat witness about the prior
statement in order to "awaken his conscience," rather than to
discredit him."' A good example of this means of escaping the
prohibition appears in Hicks v. Coleman,"5 in which the South
Carolina Supreme Court permitted the calling party, in effect to
"refresh the memory" of the witness as to his previous contradic-
tory statements. The court explained that the general rule deny-
108. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 607, 56 F.R.D. 266-67 (1972).
109. McCORMICK § 38, at 77.
110. For an acceptable alternative, see ME. R. EvD., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14 (1975
Supp.).
111. FED. R. EVID. 614(a) provides:
The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call
witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.
112. See Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 99 S.E.2d 384 (1957).
113. DREHER at 17.
114. McCoRMICK § 38, at 77 (quoting People v. Michaels, 335 Ill. 590, 592, 167 N.E.
857, 858 (1929)).
115. 240 S.C. 227, 125 S.E.2d 473 (1962).
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ing a party the right to discredit or impeach his own witness is
"subject to the exception that when a witness proves hostile or
recalcitrant, the party calling him may probe his conscience or
test his recollection to the end that the whole truth may be laid
bare; and the extent to which this may be done depends upon
judicial discretion exercised in the light of the circumstances n
which the question arises."'1
C. Rehabilitation of a Witness' Character
As has been the case at common law, federal rule 608(a)"7
provides that reputation or opinion evidence in support of a wit-
ness' character for truthfulness cannot be introduced until after
his veracity has been attacked. The justification for the limita-
tion is composed of two elements: (1) the fact that "there is no
reason why time should be spent in proving that which may be
assumed to exist,""' and (2) "the enormous needless consump-
tion of time which a contrary practice would entail ... "I"
A threshold determination in applying this limitation, how-
ever, is whether the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked. The initial determination is within the discretion
of the trial court, and in cases where it is not clear whether the
attack on a witness is an attack on his character for veracity (e.g.,
impeaching a witness by proof of prior inconsistent statements),
the court will usually consider whether the circumstances of the
attack (i.e., did the witness' denial allay the jury's doubts) "seem
to indicate a want of trustworthiness."'20 With respect to the
question of whether the witness' character for truthfulness has
been attacked, the Advisory Committee's note to rule 608 states:
116. Id. at 229-30, 125 S.E.2d 474 (quoting State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 424, 7
S.E.2d 72, 73 (1940)).
117. FED. R. EVID. 608(a) provides:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in
the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the
witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise.
118. 4 WIGMORE § 1104.
119. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EviD. 608, 56 F.R.D. 268 (1972).
120. Outlaw v. United States, 81 F.2d 805, 808 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
665 (1936). The "considering the circumstances" approach is endorsed by the Advisory
Committee's Note to FED. R. EviD. 608, 56 F.R.D. 268 (1972).
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Opinion or reputation that the witness is untruthful specifically
qualifies as an attack under the rule, and evidence of miscon-
duct, including conviction of crime, and of corruption also fall
within this category. Evidence of bias or interest does not.",
Although the law in South Carolina is in basic agreement
with federal rule 608,122 the supreme court has recognized a pecu-
liar exception to the common law rule restricting accreditation of
a witness' character for truthfulness before an attack on his char-
acter has been launched.
In Woods v. Thrower, 2 plaintiff brought an action to recover
possession of an automobile. The dispute apparently arose when
defendant, an automobile repairman, refused to deliver the car
to the plaintiff's agent upon the tender of the $100 agreed repair
price. The defendant contended that no set price was agreed upon
and that the actual cost of repair was $230, thus claiming a lien
for repairs and refusing to surrender the car until the $230 was
paid. At trial, Judge Whaley overruled the defendant's objection
to testimony to show the reputation of the witness, plaintiff's
agent, for truth, veracity and fair dealing. The record revealed
that the witness "was a resident of Marion, and not of Richland
County, in which the action was tried."'2 4 The defendant ap-
pealed, contending that the judge's ruling was erroneous since the
character of the witness for truth and veracity had not been at-
tacked and was not, therefore, in need of rehabilitation.
The South Carolina Supreme Court stated the question as
"whether the rule heretofore announced (prohibiting accrediting
before an attack) is applicable, when the witness is a stranger in
the vicinage from which the jury is drawn.' 25 The court answered
in the negative, distinguishing long-standing contrary preced-
ent,' 2 and held the testimony admissible. In order to justify this
exception, the court stated:
121. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVD. 608, 56 F.R.D. 268-69 (1972) (cita-
tions omitted).
122. See, e.g., Heretis v. Taggs, 217 S.C. 369, 60 S.E.2d 689 (1950); State v. Gibert,
196 S.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 451 (1941); State v. Gilstrap, 149 S.C. 445, 147 S.E. 600 (1929);
State v. Knox, 98 S.C. 114, 82 S.E. 278 (1914); State v. Murphy, 48 S.C. 1, 25 S.E. 43
(1896); State v. Robertson, 26 S.C. 117, 1 S.E. 443 (1887).
123. 116 S.C. 165, 107 S.E. 250 (1921).
124. Id. at 166, 107 S.E. 251.
125. Id.
126. Chapman v. Cooley, 46 S.C.L. (12 Rich.) 654 (1860).
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The reason why an exception should be made to the general rule
. . . is that a party to the action whose witness comes from the
vicinage has an advantage over his opponent, whose witness is
a stranger, as the good character of a witness known to the jurors
may be taken into consideration by the jury. The rights of the
parties are equalized, as far as possible, by allowing testimony
as to the good character of the witness, who is a stranger, to be
shown before it is attacked.'1
The court's reasoning, however, falls victim to a major fal-
lacy, that the jury is knowledgeable concerning the character for
truthfulness of witnesses "coming from the vicinage" and that
this knowledge gives the local party an unfair advantage over the
foreigner, about whom the jury has no "out-of-court" knowledge.
This assumption seems highly suspect in light of the increased
mobility and density of the American populace.' Moreover, most
jurors are carefully screened with respect to their personal knowl-
edge or feelings about the parties involved in an action. The
theory that "out-of-court" knowledge will inevitably influence
the jury's willingness to believe one side or another also appears
doubtful.12 9 Finally, the court's opinion seems to accept the prop-
osition that a jury can legitimately take into consideration their
personal knowledge (i.e., out-of-court knowledge) as to the char-
acter of the witnesses.' 0 This proposition seems prima facie sus-
pect since the traditional practice is to instruct the jury that they
are limited to the evidence produced and that they must draw
their conclusions from the testimony adduced at trial and not
from any other source.' 3' To hold otherwise would appear to pose
significant right to confrontation problems.
1 32
127. 116 S.C. at 170, 107 S.E. at 251-52.
128. See generally, V. PAcKARD, A NATION OF STRANGERS passim (1973).
129. But see Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement: An Empirical Look,
45 NEB. L. REv. 99 (1966).
130. See 116 S.C. at 169, 107 S.E. at 251, citing State v. Jacob, 30 S.C. 131, 8 S.E.
698 (1888).
131. Contra, State v. Jacob, 30 S.C. 131, 8 S.E. 698 (1889); State v. Jones, 29 S.C.
201, 7 S.E. 296 (1888); McKain v. Love, 19 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 506 (1834).
132. See, e.g., Palestroni v. Jacobs, 10 N.J. Super. 266, 77 A.2d 183 (1950). Compare
Thomas v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 185 Kan. 6, 340 P.2d 379 (1959) with Rostad v.
Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 101 Or. 569, 201 P. 184 (1921) and Solberg v. Robbins Lumber
Co., 147 Wis. 259, 133 N.W. 28 (1911) and Downing v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 158
Iowa 1, 138 N.W. 917 (1912). The problem, of course, involves how the jury can be
prevented from considering extrajudicial evidence. See Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury
with Facts not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. Ra,. 139 (1956);
THAYER, EVIDENCE 174 (1898).
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The federal rule does not contemplate such an exception,
although traditionally the federal courts have been lenient in
cases where error has been alleged because of one party accredit-
ing a witness before his character for veracity has come under
attack.'33 Under the federal rules, an error in permitting rehabili-
tation evidence before an attack on the witness' character has
taken place will be judged according to the standards enumerated
in rule 103.'11
Since the peculiar exception recognized in South Carolina
does not appear justified either by logic or experience, the best
approach would be to adopt the position that rehabilitation is not
permitted before the witness' character for veracity has been at-
tacked. However, this general proposition can be tempered some-
what, as it is in the federal system, by acknowledging the trial
court's discretion to consider whether the circumstances would
justify departure from the general rule.'35 Recognizing the court's
discretion would preserve the rule's salutary effects without risk-
ing unfairness or injustice in exceptional situations.'36
D. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
At common law a person convicted of a felony, treason, or
crimen falsi was considered incompetent to testify. Over the past
century, however, this rule has been transformed into a general
rule of credibility rather than competency. Hence, the rule in
most of the states and in the federal courts today is that evidence
of a prior conviction may be introduced to impeach the credibility
of a witness. The conclusion that a prior conviction is a relevant
133. See, e.g., United States v. Sears, 332 F.2d 199, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1964) (where a
deaf person identified a bank robber, and the court allowed a witness to testify that deaf
persons often compensate for loss of hearing by training other senses; appellate court held
there was no error in admitting this testimony and that in any case no objection had been
raised); Kauz v. United States, 188 F.2d 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1951) (holding such testimony to
be harmless error); cf. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Luray Supply Co., 6 F.2d 218 (4th
Cir. 1925).
134. FED. R. EVD. 103.
135. See notes 117-18 and accompanying text supra.
136. A recent report by the Committee on Evidence to the New Jersey Supreme Court
acknowledged the superiority of this flexible approach:
There may be many cases where it would be of value to the jury to have an
appraisal of the witness as truth-teller even where the opponent refuses to cross-
examine, and where such an offer would neither consume excessive time nor
would surprise. In such cases the judge should be empowered to admit the
evidence.
Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court by the Committee on Evidence 64-65 (1973).
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consideration with respect to the question of an individual's pro-
pensity for truth-telling is a product of the following subjunctives:
(1) if a person has a criminal past, then he has a bad general
character; (2) if a person has a bad general character, then he is
a type of person who would be likely to disregard the obligation
to testify truthfuly.'37
Obviously, the use of prior convictions to impeach a witness
is closely allied with two often conflicting goals of the legal sys-
tem-protecting the innocent and insuring that the guilty receive
their just desert. As one commentator observed:
Permitting unlimited use of defendant's criminal past for
impeachment undoubtedly results in more convictions; it also
increases the likelihood that a person will be found guilty who,
this time at least, has not committed a crime. Limiting the use
of convictions for impeachment provides more protection for the
innocent, but it also raises the spectre of the guilty out on the
streets because the jury has been denied information helpful in
evaluating the credibility of witnesses.'35
Federal rule 609,139 which went through a number of revisions
137. "A demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of
accepted patterns is translated into willingness to give false testimony." Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to the first draft of FED. R. Evm. 609, 56 F.R.D. 297 (1968). There are
significant problems with the basic validity of the assumed psychological truths that form
the underpinning of the syllogism stated in the text. See 2 WIGMORE § 519, at 610-11,
quoting from BFNTHAm, RATMNALE OF JuDicIAL EVIDENCE book IX, pt. HI, ch. I (Bowring's
ed. 1827).
138. 3 WEINSTEIN 609[01], at 609-47.
139. FED. R. EVID. 609 provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the proba-
tive value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the pun-
ishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible
if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction
or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that convic-
tion, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evi-
dence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissi-
ble unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
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before reaching its final form, attempts to strike a balance be-
tween these two conflicting ends. It is a rather complex and de-
tailed rule which imposes a number of conditions and standards
on the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes.
The most important elements of rule 609 are found in subpara-
graphs (a) and (b). Briefly, the rule works something like this:
evidence of a previous conviction can be introduced for the pur-
pose of attacking the credibility of a witness if such evidence is
elicited from the witness or established by public record during
cross-examination, but the crime must (1) be "punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year. . . , and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
will outweigh its prejudicial effect to the defendant," or (2) in-
volve "dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punish-
ment." 4 ' Thus, a conviction for a crime that is punishable by less
than a year' and which does not involve dishonesty or false
statement is not (presumably because of its low probative value)
usable for impeachment purposes. Introduction of evidence of
conviction for a misdemeanor, then, depends on the trial judge's
ascertainment of exactly which misdemeanors involve dishonesty
or false statement.12 In addition, rule 609(a) contemplates that a
prior felony' conviction (not involving dishonesty or false state-
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evi-
dence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is gener-
ally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case
allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an
appeal is admissible.
140. FED. R. Evm. 609(a).
141. Note that the rule refers to punishment that may be imposed, not that which is
imposed. FED. R. EvD. 609(a)(1).
142. See generally 3 WEiNsTEiN T 609[03], at 609-65 n.8.
143. A "felony" represents the congressional demarcation for offenses punishable by
more than one year. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
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ment) may not be used unless the court makes a determination"'
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect on the defendant. 5 Prior felony convictions of
a prosecution witness, however, can always be introduced for
impeachment purposes, thereby avoiding potential right to con-
frontation problems.'"
Subparagraph (b) of rule 609 also serves to strike a balance
between protecting the innocent and punishing the guilty by gen-
erally imposing a time limitation on the admissibility of prior
convictions. If more than ten years has elapsed from the date of
conviction or the date of the witness' release, whichever is later,
the conviction generally is not usable for impeachment pur-
poses. '47 Evidence of a conviction outside of this ten-year rule may
be admitted, however, if two conditions are met: (1) the propo-
nent gives advance written notice of intent to use such evidence
(to enable the adverse party to prepare to contest its use); and
(2) the court determines, in light of the specific facts, circum-
stances, and nature of the evidence, that the probative value of
the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
The remaining sections of rule 609 provide special limitations
on the use of a prior conviction. Subparagraph (c) prohibits the
introduction of a prior conviction that has been the subject of a
pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation or other equiva-
lent procedure if such procedure was (1) based on innocence, or
(2) required a showing of rehabilitation and the witness has not
been subsequently convicted of a felony.'
Subparagraph (d) of rule 609 explicitly forbids the admission
into evidence of a juvenile adjudication if the witness is the ac-
cused in a criminal case."4 The rule does allow the court some
144. Note that the burden of going forward with the proof that the conviction may
be used rests on the prosecution. 3 WEINSTEIN 609[03], at 609-67.
145. The language of rule 609 can be construed to include defense witnesses. For a
thorough enumeration of the factors to be considered by a court in this determination,
see 3 WEINSTEIN 609[03], at 609-68 to 80.
146. 3 WEINSTEIN 609[03], at 609-66. See 120 CONG. REc. 40893 (1974) (statement
of Rep. Hungate explaining Conference Report version of rule 609).
147. Note the proposal by the South Carolina Trial Lawyers to add an exception
where the person has been convicted more than once of a crime covered by the rule, quoted
in 3 WEINSTEIN T 609[03], at 609-70 n.23.
148. The burden is on the counsel for the party-witness to show that evidence of
conviction is not admissible pursuant to rule 609(c). 3 WEINSTEIN T 609[04], at 609-84.
No relevant South Carolina cases on this matter have been found.
149. See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evil. 609, 56 F.R.D. 270-72 (1972).
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discretion in admitting evidence of a prior juvenile adjudication
if the witness is other than the defendant and if "the court is
satisfied that admission into evidence is necessary for a fair deter-
mination of the issue of guilt or innocence."' 5
Subparagraph (e) follows the majority rule in federal courts
by allowing the admission of a prior conviction even when an
appeal is pending. The rule also permits evidence of the appeal's
pendency to be introduced in mitigation of the conviction.'
5'
Against this background, the law of South Carolina on this
issue of admitting prior convictions for the purpose of impeach-
ment has diverged into three areas. Beginning with the most
modest divergence, South Carolina apparently does not impose
any condition that the evidence of a prior conviction be intro-
duced or presented only during cross-examination. 5 Rule 609(a),
on the other hand, does require that a witness' credibility be
impeached only on cross-examination either by eliciting an ad-
mission by the convicted witness himself or by establishing the
public record of the conviction.' 53 The South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Van Williams, '5 that evidence of a
prior conviction may be admitted for the purpose of impeaching
the witness' credibility at any stage in the trial and that its ad-
mission is not restricted to the reply or cross-examination, was
based on the following reasoning:
If appellant felt aggrieved by what he claims to be new matter
brought into the case after he had closed his testimony, his
remedy was to request the Court to permit him to offer addi-
tional evidence by way of rejoinder. If he had any testimony to
offer in response to this alleged new matter and had requested
Congress added "criminal case" to make it clear that this cannot be used in a civil
proceeding. 3 WEINSTEIN I 609[05], at 609-86.
150. FED. R. EVID. 609(d). S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1095.40 (1962) provides that the
official records of the family court can only be inspected with the consent of the trial judge
by "persons having a legitimate interest therein." No case in South Carolina has squarely
decided, however, whether such records could be admitted in order to impeach a juvenile
witness. But see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), wherein the United States Supreme
Court held that the constitution-specifically the sixth amendment-guarantees a defen-
dant the right to use a juvenile conviction in order to impeach a witness.
151. See 3 WEiNsTEiN 609[06]. There is no corresponding law, judicial or statutory,
in South Carolina.
152. See State v. Van Williams, 212 S.C. 110, 46 S.E.2d 665 (1948).
153. See FED. R. EvID. 901 & 1005 for authentication and proving contents of docu-
ments.
154. 212 S.C. 110, 46 S.E.2d 665 (1948).
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the Court to permit him to offer it, no doubt such permission
would have been granted. .... 115
This procedure seems acceptable, although it is conceivable that
introducing a record of prior convictions at a later stage in the
trial, rather than during cross-examination, could have a greater
psychological impact on the jury as independent corroboration of
the accused's guilt as to this crime, rather than going merely to
the accused's propensity for lying.
An additional complication might be presented by the su-
preme court's decision in State v. Gregg,"' in which an accused
was denied the opportunity to testify on redirect examination to
certain mitigating details with respect to a prior conviction that
was introduced by the prosecution in an effort to impeach the
accused's credibility. The decision of the court in Gregg, strictly
read, would apparently undermine the Van Williams decision
since the accused in the latter case would not be allowed to go
into the "details" of the former conviction in response to the
prosecution's introduction of that fact at a later stage. Although
the court's opinion in Gregg was far from clear, it appears to hold
that the accused could not testify as to any details in mitigation
with respect to the prior conviction because "[hie had already
been afforded opportunity to defend himself against that charge
and his plea of guilty was conclusive.' 5 7 The prohibition against
introducing evidence of the "details" of the former crime, how-
ever, is directed more to the prosecution in an effort to minimize
the amount of prejudice to the accused (as well as distraction
from the issues) resulting from similarities between the past and
present crime." 8 Moreover, what possible reason could there be
for saying that the accused had ample opportunity to defend
himself against the former charge and, therefore, has no need for
explaining the circumstances of the prior conviction when con-
fronted with that conviction at his present trial? Perhaps the
most plausible explanation is that such a statement is "a logical
consequence of the premise of conclusiveness of the judgment.'
59
However, as Professor McCormick has stated, such a consequence
"does not . . . satisfy our feeling that some reasonable outlet for
155. Id. at 112-13, 46 S.E.2d at 666.
156. 230 S.C. 222, 95 S.E.2d 255 (1956). See generally KAJvEN & ZEISEL at 124-62.
157. 230 S.C. at 225, 95 S.E.2d at 257 (citation omitted).
158. See 3 WFsTEN 609[03], at 609-79.
159. MCCORMICK § 43, at 89.
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the instinct of self-defense by one attacked should be conceded,
if it can be done without too much damage to the business at
hand."' 6 Thus, a court should perhaps indulge in the "harmless
charity"'6' of permitting a witness to make a brief and general
statement in mitigation or explanation of guilt.6 ' Under the fed-
eral rules, the scope of such a statement would be delimited by
rule 403, which grants discretion to the trial judge to exclude
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by considerations of
undue delay, confusion or prejudice. Perhaps South Carolina trial
judges should recognize and exercise a similar discretion.
A second area of divergence between South Carolina law and
federal rule 609 involves the degree of remoteness of the prior
conviction. In Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,'63 the
supreme court held that in order for evidence of a prior conviction
to be admitted for impeachment purposes, it "should not be too
remote in time.""'6 The Gantt opinion did not reveal just how
remote the prior conviction was in that case; but in State v. Van
Williams' the court permitted the use of a conviction for house-
breaking that had occurred thirteen years earlier.
The preferred view is to limit the use of a prior conviction
when it is so remote that its probative value is doubtful. Rule
609(b) expressly incorporates this condition. The justification for
such a limitation was aptly explained by a federal court:
The nearness or remoteness of the prior conviction is also a
factor of no small importance. Even one involving fraud or steal-
ing, for example, if it occurred long before and has been followed
by a legally blameless life, should generally be excluded on the
grounds of remoteness. 6'
The trial court, of course, would have the discretion to consider
such factors as the mode of life of the witness since the conviction
and the nature of the crime underlying the conviction in deciding
whether a conviction before the ten year limitation should never-
theless be admitted. Perhaps, in the case of a prosecution witness
160. Id.
161. 4 WIoMoaE § 1117, at 251.
162. See MCCORMICK § 43, at 89 n. 84.
163. 204 S.C. 374, 29 S.E.2d 488 (1944).
164. Id. at 379, 29 S.E.2d at 490.
165. 212 S.C. 110, 46 S.E.2d 665 (1948); see notes 154-55 and accompanying text
supra.
166. See 3 WEINSTEIN 609[03], at 609-69.
[Vol. 28
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for example, a remote conviction should be admitted to obviate
any constitutional right to confrontation problem that might
present itself.'
The third and final divergence between South Carolina law
and federal rule 609 concerns the types of crimes that qualify for
use in the impeachment process. As discussed previously, 6 ' the-
federal rule sets specific guidelines as to the types of crimes that
may be used for impeachment, i.e., felony convictions whether or
not they involved dishonesty or false statement where the court
explicitly finds that the probative value of admitting such evi-
dence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, and con-
victions for misdemeanors involving dishonesty or false state-
ment. The relevant South Carolina cases, however, are extremely
flexible in delimiting the types of crimes that may be used.' 9
In State v. Chasteen171 the supreme court, in holding that
evidence of an accused's prior conviction for sexual assault was
admissible for impeachment of his credibility as a witness, con-
cluded that prior crimes which involve the element of "moral
delinquency" are relevant and admissible. Similarly, the court
had stated in Gantt that cross-examination with respect to prior
convictions "should be restricted to crimes involving . . .the
element of moral delinquency. ' 17' The accused in Gantt had been
convicted of violating a federal tax statute that required proof of
an intent to defraud as an essential element thereof. Thus, the
court felt that the accused's guilty plea to the charge involved the
element of moral delinquency, and therefore, evidence of the con-
viction was admissable for impeachment.
The federal approach embodied in rule 609 is a partial step
towards defining the exact nature of admissable prior convictions
167. Id. at 609-70; see text accompanying note 146 supra.
168. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
169. See, e.g., Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 204 S.C. 374, 29 S.E.2d
488 (1944); State v. Bing, 115 S.C. 506, 106 S.E. 573 (1919); State v. Wyse, 33 S.C. 582,
12 S.E. 556 (1890). See also DREHER at 18.
170. 231 S.C. 141, 97 S.E.2d 517 (1957). The Chasteen court gave itself wide leeway
in delimiting the type of past conduct that is admissible with the following nonrule
verbiage:
[Tihere can be laid down no fixed rule as to what is admissible on cross-
examination with respect to the past conduct of a defendant who takes the stand
as a witness. That is admissible which fairly tends to affect his credibility as a
witness; that which does not is incompetent and may be prejudicial.
Id. at 145, 97 S.E.2d at 519.
171. 204 S.C. at 379, 29 S.E.2d at 489-90.
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in order to insure greater relevancy and probative value. The
spirit of rule 609 is to provide certain basic safeguards applicable
to all witnesses and especially to an accused who elects to tes-
tify.' The advantage of the federal approach over South Caro-
lina's "moral delinquency" standard is the increased focus on
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. The moral delin-
quency test seems to assume that because a man is convicted of
assault or manslaughter it is also likely that he will lie when on
the witness stand. The federal rule, ostensibly cognizant of the
fallacy in that reasoning,7 3 directs the trial judge to admit only
those types of crimes-such as perjury, subordination of perjury,
barratry, suppression of evidence, or embezzlement-that clearly
involve elements of dishonesty and false statement.7 4 Because of
the very real danger of prejudice to an accused that exists when
evidence of a prior conviction is used for impeachment purposes
South Carolina courts should develop a more defined standard'
7 5
for the type of crime that is most relevant and probatively valua-
ble to the issue of credibility.
E. Scope of Cross-Examination
Subdivision (b) of federal rule 611176 represents the tradi-
tional approach of the federal courts (and most of the states) in
restricting the scope of cross-examination to those matters
brought out during the direct examination, or to facts that tend
to discredit the witness. The justifications advanced by Congress
for rejecting the wide-open rule of cross-examination (the view
preferred by the Advisory Committee) and instead adopting the
restrictive rule were basically threefold: (1) restricting the scope
of cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examina-
tion will facilitate the orderly presentation of a case by each party
at the trial; (2) the expanded scope of modern discovery proce-
dures makes the need for abandoning the traditional restrictive
172. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(1).
173. See 3 WEINSTEIN $ 609[02], at 609-57 for criticism of this argument.
174. Id. at 609103], at 609-64.
175. Id. at 609-60 to -62 (listing four different approaches to the determination of
what types of crimes should be admitted).
176. FED. R. EviD. 611(b) provides:
Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct exami-
nation and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in
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rule less compelling; and (3) the trial judge, under rule 611(b),
will have the discretion to permit inquiry into additional matters
as the need arises.
South Carolina is among a minority of states that adhere to
the orthodox or "open door" rule of cross-examination.'77 In line
with this approach, the permissible scope of cross-examination
extends to any issue relevant to the case and is not confined to
those matters pursued on direct. Any matters affecting the credi-
bility of the witness, of course, are also within the scope of permis-
sible cross-examination. Accordingly, limitations on the scope of
cross-examination emanate solely from the trial judge's discre-
tion to proscribe questioning with respect to matters, for exam-
ple, whose probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial im-
pact, or as to matters that threaten to confuse the issues, waste
time, harass the witness, or, in certain instances, conflict with the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.,"
Most leading legal authorities support the orthodox rule al-
lowing cross-examination with respect to any relevant matter,
incuding matters that can be said to relate strictly to the cross-
examiner's case.' 9 This rule does indeed have much to commend
it, not the least of which is its clear superiority in maximizing the
amount of relevant evidence that gets to the jury. 8" Moreover, the
177. See, Hanson v. General Insulation & Acoustics, 234 S.C. 177, 107 S.E.2d 41
(1959); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 110 S.C. 357, 364, 96 S.E. 526, 528 (1918) ("The rule
in this State is that a party has the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the adverse
party on any subject pertinent to the issue."); Bunch v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 91 S.C.
139, 74 S.E. 363 (1912); State v. McGree, 55 S.C. 247, 33 S.E. 358 (1898) (same rule applies
to a criminal accused who takes the stand); Sims v. Jones, 43 S.C. 91, 20 S.E. 205 (1895);
Kairson v. Puckhaber, 14 S.C. 626 (1880); Mathews v. Heyward, 2 S.C. 239, 247 (1870);
Clinton v. McKenzie, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 41 (1850); Poole v. Mitchell, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill)
404 (1833); Browning v. Huff, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 174, 178 (1831).
178. See 3 WEINSTEIN 611[03] & [04]. The outer limits with respect to an accused
in a criminal case may be set by constitutional doctrine as to the extent to which an
accused waives his privilege of self-incrimination by taking the stand and testifying.
Carlson, Cross-examination of the Accused, 52 CoRNELL L.Q. 705 (1967).
The two major approaches to setting these outer limits may be stated as follows:
(1) Professors Wigmore and McCormick believe that a defendant who takes the stand
waives his privilege as to every relevant fact except facts merely affecting credibility (cf.
FED. R. Evm. 608); (2) Professor Carlson, on the other hand, contends that if there is a
good reason why a defendant should not be compelled to be a witness against himself,
there is an equally good reason why he should not be compelled to testify against his Will
respecting matters untouched by his direct testimony.
179. See, e.g., McCoRMIcK § 27; MOORE, FEDEA.L PACrI CE 43.10 (2d ed. 1964);
MORGAN, BASIC-PROBLEMS OF EviDENCE 65-67 (1962); WIGMORE §§ 1885-1890.
180. For a consideration of the contrary effect by the restrictive approach, see
MCCORMICK § 23, at 49-51.
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orthodox rule avoids the fractious controversy arising under the
restrictive rule that frequently embroils the trial and appellate
courts in the question of whether or not the "scope of the direct"
has been exceeded by a particular line of cross-examination.,,' In
fact, the Advisory Committee to the federal rules, after reviewing
many of the justifications traditionally offered in favor of the
restrictive rule,'S came to the conclusion that the balance in favor
of the orthodox rule was significantly enhanced by the considera-
tions of judicial economy in time and energy." 3
The question that one must surely ask, then, is why Con-
gress, in the face of so much commentary critical of the restrictive
rule, decided to retain that very rule in 611(b). Perhaps one ex-
planation is that the restrictive rule
represents an approach to litigation which was formerly in vogue
and has not yet fallen completely into disrepute, an approach
which viewed litigation as a game between the parties which
could only be won by strict adherence to the rules regardless of
whether the rules promoted the ascertainment of truth.""
If the purpose of a system of evidentiary rules is the pursuit of
truth via maximizing the availability of relevant evidence, the
open door policy of the orthodox rule is clearly preferable.
181. The rule limiting cross-examination to the precise subject of the direct
examination is probably the most frequent rule (except the opinion rule) leading
in trial practice today to refined and technical quibbles which obstruct the
progress of the trial, confuse the jury, and give rise to appeal on technical
grounds only.
63 ABA Reports 587 (1938); accord, Report of Committe of S.C. Chapter College of Trial
Lawyers 7 (1970).
182. The arguments in favor of the restrictive rule are as follows:
(1) the party vouches for his own witness only to extent of the subject matter
he elicits on direct;
(2) unlimited cross-examination will enable a party to make out his case by
leading questions;
(3) limited cross-examination promotes continuity and order by keeping the
opponent from interrupting the proponent and confusing the jury until the
proponent has finished with his presentation of the case.
4 JONES, EVIDENCE § 908, at 1700 (5th ed. 1958).
Each of these arguments is easily dispelled. As to (1), federal rule 607, which abro-
gates the prohibition on impeaching one's own witness, renders this criticism moot. In
addition, while the concept of vouching had some medieval significance, it has no bearing
on our system of free evaluation of credibility and probative force. Argument (2) is ren-
dered moot by federal rule 611(c). As to argument (3), one must wonder by what reasoning
should the direct examiner be entitled, in all fairness, to the "psychological advantage of
presenting the facts in this falsely simple and one-sided way?" MCCORMICK §27, at 31.
183. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evw. 611, 56 F.R.D. 273-76 (1972).
184. 3 WEINSTEIN 611[02], at 611-29.
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F. Prior Statements of Witnesses
Federal rule 613185 provides the foundational prerequisites
for the introduction of prior inconsistent statements, whether oral
or written. 86 It represents an effort to strike a balance between
two competing theories: one holding that unlimited cross-
examination is the best method for exposing false statements;
and the other preferring to bring the circumstances of a prior
statement to the attention of the witness to refresh his or her
recollection of its making and thereby to insure the higher proba-
tive value of the testimony before the jury.8 7 The latter approach
is the orthodox rule and is the rule in a majority of American
jurisdictions, including South Carolina. 8'
Rule 613 has made certain fundamental changes in the foun-
dational requirements that prevail under the orthodox rule; basi-
cally, it gives greater weight to the element of surprise "as a
technique for ferreting out the truth."'8 9 The orthodox rule, ac-
cepting the theory that forewarning a witness of the circumstan-
ces of a prior statement before cross-examination will increase the
accuracy of his testimony, is composed of two elements: (1) the
idea that the proponent of a prior inconsistent statement must
produce the contents of such a statement before questioning the
witness with respect to any conflict with his present testimony,
and (2) the idea that the proponent must ask the witness "in
advance-i.e., on cross-examination and before any other testi-
185. FED. R. Evm. 613 provides:
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a
witness concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the
statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but
on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Ex-
trinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible
unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and
the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the
interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admis-
sions of a party-opponent as defined in rule 801(d)(2).
186. Under the principle of expressio unius, federal rule 613 does not apply to im-
peachment by evidence of prior inconsistent conduct; nor does rule 613 restrict defen-
dant's rights under rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (allowing discov-
ery of documents and tangible things) or defendant's rights under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 612 (allowing examination of writing used to refresh witness' memory).
187. The second theory has the collateral advantage of saving time when the witness
simply admits making the prior statement. 3 WmNsTFm 613[01], at 613-18.
188. 3 WEINSTFAN 613[01], at 613-18.
189. Id. at 613-19.
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mony to the prior self-contradiction is offered-whether he made
the contradictory statement which it is designed to prove"'," and
give the specific context in which the statement was made. Thus,
under the orthodox rule, before a prior inconsistent statement
could be proved against a witness, the proponent must ask the
witness about the statement during cross-examination and lay
the proper foundation for such proof by informing the witness of
"when, where, and to whom" he was supposed to have made the
statement. In Elliott v. Black River Electric Co-op,'' the South
Carolina Supreme Court stated that
the purpose of the preliminary questioning (i.e., laying the foun-
dation) of the witness is to adequately apprise him of the partic-
ular circumstances on which and the occasion on which it is
claimed that he made the former statement, so that he may be
prepared to disprove it or explain it away.
92
As a natural corollary to this rule, the supreme court has also held
that if the witness admits making the previous statement, then
no further evidence thereof may be received, and the witness
must be allowed, if he so chooses, to explain the seeming con-
flict.'9 3
Federal rule 613 unqualifiedly rejects the first element of the
orthodox rule as giving too much advantage to the dishonest wit-
ness. Thus in federal courts the cross-examiner need not produce
the contents of the prior inconsistent statement before question-
190. 3 WIGMORE § 1019, at 691. See also State v. Galloway, 263 S.C. 585, 211 S.E.2d
885 (1975) (it is not required that the witness be notified of the cross-examiner's intent to
contradict).
191, 233 S.C. 233, 104 S.E.2d 357 (1958).
192. 233 S.C. at 261, 104 S.E.2d at 372.
193. McMillan v. Ridges, 229 S.C. 76, 91 S.E.2d 883 (1956). Furthermore, in State
v. Bottoms, 260 S.C. 187, 194, 195 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1973), the supreme court affirmed the
rule that "where the making of the inconsistent statement is denied and it is appropriate
to introduce such for the purpose of impeachment, it is the duty of the court, upon request,
to instruct the jury that it can consider such evidence for the purpose of impeachment
only, not as substantive evidence of the facts."
It would seem that this salutary rule could be further relaxed such that the court
could give such a "contemporaneous" limiting instruction sua sponte. cf. FED. R. EVWD.
105. In State v. Galloway, 263 S.C. 585, 211 S.E.2d 885 (1975), the South Carolina Su-
preme Court took time out to explore the "rather prevalent trial superstition" that before
a prior inconsistent statement can be introduced in order to impeach the witness the cross-
examining party must expressly notify the witness that the cross-examiner is prepared to
contradict his statement if he denies making the statement. The court summarily dis-
pensed with this contention, noting that the general law and the law of South Carolina is
that notice as to substance, time, place and person is sufficient foundation for contradict-
ing testimony. Id. at 591, 211 S.E.2d at 888.
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ing the witness with respect to any conflict with his present testi-
mony.'94 However, rule 613 does seek to promote the accuracy of
testimony by providing under subdivision (a) for disclosure of the
prior statement's contents to the opposing counsel in order to give
assurance of the cross-examiner's good faith and to protect the
witness from being misled or unfairly discredited by unwarranted
insinuations about the statement.
Subdivision (b) of rule 613 preserves the foundation element
of the orthodox rule but with certain modifications that noticea-
bly diverge from the usual practice in most states, including
South Carolina. Basically, rule 613(b) relaxes the requirement,
often inflexibily applied, that the witness' attention be directed
to the statement on cross-examination (by enumerating the cir-
cumstances of its making). All that rule 613(b) demands is that
the witness be given an opportunity to explain and the opposing
party an opportunity to examine the statement. It does not, how-
ever, specify any particular time sequence for such explanation
or examination. This procedure diverges from that required by
the orthodox rule by enabling counsel to "surprise" the witness
with the prior statement in the hopes of either eliciting an
admission or discrediting his testimony in the eyes of the jury.
This procedure will have the advantage over the orthodox rule
when a dishonest witness is involved.
195
Perhaps the most important part of rule 613(b), however, is
the phrase "or the interests of justice require otherwise," which
is a special provision granting discretion to the court to dispense
with the witness' right to explain or deny. "' Such a situation
194. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Evm. 613, 56 F.R.D. 183, 273-74 (1972),
states in part:
Rule 613 abolishes the requirement-first espoused in The Queen's Case, 2 Br.
& B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820)-that a cross-examiner, before he can ques-
tion a witness about his own prior statement in writing, must first adduce the
writing and present it for inspection by the witness to be cross-examined.
McCormick at § 28 criticizes the rule as a misconception of the notion that
required the production of the original document when its contents are sought
to be proved. It is a misconception because (1) the cross-examiner is not seek-
ing, at this stage, to prove the contents of the writing by the witness' answers
and (2) the original document rule requires that production of the document as
proof of its contents to the judge and the jury, not to the witness.
195. The Advisory Committee's note admits that "under this procedure, several col-
lusive witnesses can be examined before disclosure of a joint prior inconsistent state-
ment." Id.
196. See 3 WEINSTEIN 613[04], at 613-23; Advisory Committee Note to FED. R.
EVID. 613, 56 F.R.D. 278 (1972).
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might arise if the prior statement was not discovered by counsel
until after the witness had testified and, through no error of coun-
sel, is not available for reexamination. Outside of this situation,
however, the court's discretion under rule 613(b) to waive the
witness' right to explain or deny should seldom need to be exer-
cised.'07
In addition, it is interesting to note that the federal rule does
not seem to require the proponent of the inconsistent statement
to afford the witness an opportunity to explain the inconsistency
once he has testified, left the stand, and since become unavaila-
ble. The rule merely provides that the witness must have an
opportunity. Apparently neither side has the burden of recalling
the witness who has left the stand to provide that opportunity,
and it is almost certain that the impeaching party will not wish
to do so. By informing the court and opposing counsel that he
intends to introduce an inconsistent statement, the proponent
would apparently satisfy the rule and thereby avoid any problems
since the opposing counsel could insure the subsequent availabil-
ity of the witness if there was a need for explanation.' 8
Both the federal rule and the orthodox rule find support
among the legal commentators. To prefer one approach over the
other would be precisely that, a preference. Wigmore strongly
believed in unlimited cross-examination as the most reasonable
and successful method for the discovery of lies. The federal rule
apparently leans more in this direction and away from the ortho-
dox rule. Adherents of the orthodox rule, however, do not seek to
impose limits on the discovery of lies but rather to protect "the
honest but forgetful witness who may be startled or lulled into
giving inaccurate testimony and therefore made to appear more
discreditable than he really is . . ... "I As the middle ground
197. The practicality of recalling the witness 'the significance of the issue
to which the statement relates, the consequence4 of not allowing the statement
to be used, the efficacy of an instruction if the jury has been made aware of the
statement, and all the other factors present must be weighed by the judge in
determining whether he will excuse compliance with the requirements of Rule
613(b). In order to prevent counsel from introducing the statement when he has
no intention of meeting the foundational requirements, in the hopes of coming
within "the interest of justice" clause, the trial court should require him to state,
at the time he makes the offer, what his procedure will be if the witness subse-
quently denies or explains and whether he has any reason to believe the witness
will deny or explain.
3 WEINSTEIN 613[04], at 613-24 (footnote omitted).
198. Id. at 613-24 to -25.
199. Id. 613102], at 613-7 to -8.
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between these two opposing views, incorporating the best aspects
of each, lies perhaps a subtle but powerful reason for preferring
the approach offered in federal rule 613.
G. Exclusion of Witnesses
Federal rule 61520 represents the triumph of the position,
vigorously championed by Wigmore, that the exclusion of a wit-
ness is a matter demandable by a litigant as of right.20' Prior to
the enactment of rule 615, federal courts had treated exclusion as
a matter lying wholly within the trial judge's discretion.2 2 Ac-
cording to this practice, followed in South Carolina, a party desir-
ing exclusion or sequestration of a witness had the burden of
convincing the court to exercise its discretion and exclude the
witness.
In State v.Sharpe213 the South Carolina Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the principle that the granting or refusing of a motion for
separation or sequestration of witnesses lies within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Similarly, in State v. Homewood
2'"
the court noted that the matter of exclusion is not a demandable
right of the litigants but is a power residing wholly in the discre-
tion of the judge. In order to move the court to exercise its power
to exclude, therefore, the litigant must make a motion particular-
izing the circumstance or circumstances which justify the exer-
cise of the power.
2 11
200. FED. R. Evm. 615 provides:
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its
own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a
natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural
person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose
presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his case.
201. This exclusionary power is designed to discourage and expose fabrication, inac-
curacy and collusion. 3 WEINSTEIN 613101], at 615-4.
202. See, e.g., Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91 (1893); Taylor v. United States,
388 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1967).
203. 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961).
204. 241 S.C. 231, 128 S.E.2d 98 (1962).
205. State v. Williams, 226 S.C. 525, 85 S.E.2d 863 (1955); State v. Fuller, 227 S.C.
138, 87 S.E.2d 287 (1955). See also State v. Taylor, 261 S.C. 437, 200 S.E.2d 387 (1973);
State v. Britt, 235 S.C. 395, 111 S.E.2d 669 (1959). In Taylor, the court considered the
question of whether a defendant may confer with sequestered witnesses. Answering in the
affirmative, the court noted, however, that in affording the accused an opportunity for
conferring with his witnesses it may be necessary to take "reasonable precaution to see
that the purpose of the rule of sequestration is not defeated. . . .[R]equiring the pres-
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Obviously, the new federal rule adopts a position that is di-
rectly contrary to the practice followed in South Carolina. Rule
615 provides that a motion for exclusion is a matter demandable
by a litigant as of right. However, the rule provides two classes
of witnesses who may not be excluded: (1) a party who is a natu-
ral person, and (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not
a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney.
The reason for providing the nonexcludability of category (1) is
to obviate confrontation and due process problems, while cate-
gory (2) was included in accordance with the existing practice,
e.g., courts routinely allow agents in charge of criminal investiga-
tions to remain and advise the prosecution during the course of a
trial.20
It is important to note that rule 615, while making the matter
of exclusion a demandable right, does not eliminate the discretion
of the trial judge that existed under the practice that was tradi-
tionally followed in federal courts. Instead, rule 615 has caused a
shift in the burden of proof. Now, exclusion will be granted as a
matter of right unless the party opposing such a motion can con-
vince the court to exercise its discretion to except a particular
witness from its order.0 7 The trial judge still has the discretion
to either exclude a witness from the separation order or to invoke
the separation rule sua sponte. The rule seems to assume, how-
ever, that the judge should exercise the discretion to refuse an
order of exclusion only in cases where the motion was requested
ence of defense counsel, who is himself an officer of the'court, should be adequate precau-
tion to preserve the purpose of the rule." 261 S.C. at 443, 200 S.E.2d at 389.
In Britt, the court cited with approval 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1011, at 381:
The trial court has authority to exempt particular witnesses from the opera-
tion of the rule or order for exclusion or sequestration. The question as to what
witnesses may be exempted is largely a matter within the discretion of the court,
and, even after the granting of the rule or order excluding or sequestering the
witnesses, it is within the discretion of the trial court to permit some of them to
remain in the court room and afterward to testify if the circumstances require
it. Accordingly it is within the sound discretion of the court to permit a limited
number of witnesses to remain for the purpose of assisting the prosecution or
accused. The discretion of the court with regard to exemptions or exceptions is
not, however, an arbitrary one.
The court went on to hold that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to sequester
four police officers who remained in the court room and assisted the prosecutor. 235 S.C.
at 409-10, 111 S.E.2d at 676 (1959).
206. See 3 WEINSTEIN 615[01], at 615-7.
207. Of course, the witness cannot be excluded if within either of the two nonexcluda-
ble categories provided by the rule. FED. R. EVID. 615.
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in bad faith °.2  Thus, the federal rule, in making the matter of
exclusion a demandable right, has shifted the responsibility of





The superiority of the approach taken in federal rule 615 over
the procedure followed in South Carolina, and many other states,
is forcefully illustrated by Wigmore's exhortation which follows:
[Sequestration] seems properly to be demandable as of right,
precisely as is cross-examination. In the first place, it is simple
and feasible. In the next place, it is so powerful and practical a
weapon of defense that no contingency can justify its denial as
being a mere formality or empty sentimentality. In the third
place, in the case when it is most useful (namely, a combination
to perjure) it is almost the only hope of an innocent opponent.
After all is said and done, the fact remains . . . that successful
perjury is always a possible feature of human justice. No rule,
therefore, should ever be laid down which will by possibility
deprive an opponent of the chance of exposing perjury. Finally,
it cannot be left with the judge to say whether the resort to this
expedient is needed; not even that it will do him service; he can
merely hope for its success. He must be allowed to have the
benefit of the chance if he thinks that there is such a chance.
To require him to show some probable need to the judge, and
to leave to the latter the estimation of the need, is to misunder-
stand the whole virtue of the expedient, and to deny it in per-
haps that very situation of forlorn hope and desperate extreme
when it is most valuable and most demandable.
21'
IV. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
211
A. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
Rule 703212 provides three permissible bases for expert opin-
208. For example, a refusal might be warranted if the motion was not made in the
honest hope of exposing false testimony, but merely to obstruct the trial or embarrass the
opponent's management of the case. 6 WiGMoRE § 1839, at 468.
209. Federal rule 613 is deficient in certain minor conditions: (1) it is silent as to
what instructions the court may give witnesses when excluded; (2) it is silent as to the
consequences of noncompliance with an order for exclusion (e.g., contempt citation; per-
mitting comment on the witness' noncompliance so as to reflect on his credibility; refusing
witness' testimony or striking his testimony), and (3) it is silent as to when the demand
for exclusion must be made ("It need not be demanded at the very opening of the testi-
mony, at any time later, when the supposed exigency arises, the order may be requested."
6 WIGMORE § 1840, at 472).
210. 6 WIGMORE § 1839, at 467 (emphasis added).
211. Federal rules 701, 702, and 703 are not discussed in the text. Rule 701 abandons
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the orthodox rule of excluding lay opinion testimony in favor of a discretionary rule of
admission where the witness' opinion is rationally based upon his observations. Despite a
recognition that opinion evidence is necessary in certain instances, the rule leans toward
a factual account insofar as it is feasible. 3 WEINSTEIN 701[02]. South Carolina is
apparently in agreement with the substance of rule 701 although the breadth of that rule
is somewhat greater than South Carolina law.
As noted above, rule 701 places two limitations on the admissibility of lay opinions.
The first requirement, that the opinion be based upon the firsthand knowledge or observa-
tion of the witness, is apparently adhered to in South Carolina. See, Lynch v. Pee Dee
Express, 204 S.C. 537, 30 S.E.2d 449 (1944); Rouss v. King, 74 S.C. 251, 54 S.E. 615 (1906);
DREHER at 7. As noted in Rouss, care must be taken to avoid confusing the personal
observation requirement with the hearsay rule. The former requires personal observation
and therefore rejects the receipt in evidence of the witness' impressions based on another's
information. The hearsay rule would exclude the utterances of third party communication
when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See 2 WIGMORE § 657, at 766-67.
The second limitation of rule 701-that the opinion be helpful to the trier of fact-has
apparently been adopted by a recent South Carolina decision, State v. McClinton, 265
S.C. 171, 217 S.E.2d 584 (1975). Prior to McClinton a witness could express an opinion
only when the facts could not be so clearly described that the jury could draw its own
conclusion from them. Green v. Sparks, 232 S.C. 414, 102 S.E.2d 435 (1958). This inability
to convey the necessary facts to the jury, to allow the jury to arrive at its own conclusion
was alleviated by the so-called "shorthand rendition" rule. This "exception" to the rule
against allowing opinion evidence has been used by the courts of this state to allow a
witness to give an opinion when the facts could not be given to the jury in any other
comprehensible way. State v. Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965) (person's mental
condition); State v. Ramey, 221 S.C. 10, 68 S.E.2d 634 (1952) (intoxication); Nelson v.
Charleston W.C. Ry., 92 S.C. 151, 121 S.E. 198 (1912) (speed of train as "too fast").
McClinton, however, rejected the standard of admissibility laid down by the earlier
cases and set down a "helpfulness" standard, stating that the "opinions of laymen should
be rejected only when they are superfluous in the sense that they will be of no value to
the jury." 265 S.C. 171, 176-77, 217 S.E.2d 586. As noted by one commentator, "the
helpfulness test goes further than allowing inferences and opinions to be expressed only
when they are inextricably intertwined with the underlying observations [because it]
authorizes the trial judge to permit the witness to express an opinion when a statement
of the underlying facts would be a waste of time." 3 WEINSTEIN T 701[02], at 701-13 to -
14.
Although the South Carolina rule on lay opinions correctly prefers the concrete,
factual descriptions over abstract opinion evidence, the adoption of a rule paralleling rule
701 would tend to eliminate the time-wasting quibbling over trivial objections on the
ground of "opinion," which can still be found in the trial courts of this state, and would
in its stead admit a broader spectrum of evidence aimed at helping the trier of fact. The
emphasis should not be on how the witness is expressing himself but rather on what he
knows. Constant interruptions by counsel impair the witness' ability to express himself
as well as the jury's ability to properly evaluate his testimony. See, e.g., Central R.R. v.
Monahan, 11 F,2d 212 (2d Cir. 1926).
Rule 702 is a codification of preexisting federal law, allowing expert testimony if (1) it
will assist the trier of fact, that is, if specialized knowledge is helpful here, and (2) the
witness possesses that knowledge. South Carolina follows these requirements. See Huggins
v. Broom, 189 S.C. 15, 199 S.E. 903 (1939). Under South Carolina law, whether or not both
elements have been met is a determination within the discretion of the trial judge. Red-
man v. Ford Motor Co., 253 S.C. 266, 170 S.E.2d 207 (1969); Jenkins v. Long Motor Lines,
233 S.C. 87, 103 S.E.2d 523 (1958).
The federal rules make provision for court-appointed experts in rule 706. The inherent
power of a federal judge to appoint his own expert witness existed before rule 706. 3
WEINSTEIN 706101]. In South Carolina there is apparently no express statute or rule
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ion. The facts or data underlying an expert's opinion may come
from (1) firsthand observation, (2) presentation at trial, or
(3) presentation to the expert out of court and other than by his
own perception. The first two bases of expert testimony under
rule 703, personal observations and conclusions drawn from a
hypothetical question, are the only allowable bases of expert tes-
timony in South Carolina. 3 The second sentence of rule 703,
however, provides that an expert may base his opinion upon non-
admissible data if it is of the kind that an expert would reasona-
bly rely upon in reaching conclusions in his specialized field. '4
giving the court power to appoint expert witnesses. However, the court has exercised its
common law right to call witnesses on at least one occasion. In Elletson v. Dixie Home
Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 99 S.E.2d 384 (1957), the supreme court affirmed the trial judge's
calling of a witness on its own motion remarking that "it is a matter within the discretion
of the trial Judge." Id. at 576, 99 S.E.2d at 388. The only case raising the issue of court-
appointed experts in South Carolina is an old one which is easily distinguishable. In State
v. Pacific Guano Co., 26 S.C. 610, 2 S.E. 265 (1887), the supreme court held that the trial
court was in error in submitting some abstracts used at trial to an accountant for ex parte
verification after the trial judge had left the circuit. The court's concern centered on the
fact that the trial court's action was ex parte and that the statements of the accountant
were unsworn.
The basis of federal rule 706 is the belief that the court's expert will be less partisan
than would be the party-controlled expert. Among the stated benefits of such a system
are the encouragement of the pretrial disposition of cases, a decrease in party litigational
expenses, the alleviation of court congestion and the improvement of relationships be-
tween the legal profession and other professions. 3 WEINSTEIN 706[01]. The most fre-
quent objections to court-summoned experts are:
1. The expert deprives the parties of their constitutional right to trial by
jury ....
2. Court appointment of experts substitutes an inquisitory approach for
the traditional adversary system in which the responsibility for developing facts
lies with the parties ...
3. If there is more than one school of thought about the subject of the
expert testimony, or the subject involves theoretical approaches as well as fac-
tual material, it is impossible to obtain a neutral expert ...
4. A court-appointed expert- especially if the funds for compensation are
limited - may do "a kind of routine job" instead of the job in depth that a
party's expert would produce.
Id. at 706-9 to -11.
212. FED. R. Evm. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particu-
lar field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence.
213. Bailey v. MacDougall, 251 S.C. 290, 162 S.E.2d 177 (1968); State v. King, 158
S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1930); EasIer v. Southern Ry., 59 S.C. 311, 37 S.E. 938 (1901).
214. The Committee of New York Trial Lawyers felt that it would be too difficult to
distinguish between data that could be reasonably relied upon and data that could not
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Thus, the rule "recognizes that there may be data which has not
yet reached the degree of trustworthiness required by the hearsay
rule entitling it to consideration by the jury which nevertheless
is sufficiently reliable for an expert to assess. 2 '5 South Carolina
does not recognize this basis of expert testimony."'
This broadening of the basis for expert opinion by the federal
rules is designed "to bring the judicial practice in line with the
practice of the experts themselves when not in court. '217 The
rejection of testimony by the expert simply because he testifies
to facts which are known to him only upon the authority of others
either directly or via professional works would be in total disre-
gard of the reality of ordinary scientific inquiry and would be, in
Professor Wigmore's terms, "to insist on financial and impossible
standards. 2 18 As noted by one writer, to bar an expert from prem-
ising his opinion on the opinion of another expert would be the
adoption of a
wholly unscientific approach, since in all scientific inquiry gen-
erally one expert constantly premises an opinion on those of
fellow technicians in related or cognate fields of science; and
...the effect of such a restrictive rule will be to deprive the
trier of the fact of the full benefit of the witness' expertise.
2 9
The relaxation of the hearsay bases of expert opinion is not
a new phenomenon. Many federal and state courts have allowed
hearsay bases where expert medical testimony is involved.2 ° The
rationale behind this particular relaxation has been that hearsay
facts must frequently be relied upon and the use to which these
facts are put guarantees their reliability. 22' The trustworthiness of
these facts led to the hearsay exception found in rule 803(4) .
2
be reasonably relied upon. Project of a Committee of New York Trial Lawyers, Recom-
mendation and Study Relating to the Advisory Committee's Preliminary Draft of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 204 (June 1, 1970), discussed in 3 WEINSTEIN 703[01],
at 703-5. Despite these problems, judges frequently exercise their discretion in other areas
of the law of evidence and it is not unreasonable to assume that they could do so here
without great difficulty.
215. 3 WEINSTEIN 703[01], at 703-4.
216. See Glenn v. Duncan Mills, 242 S.C. 535, 131 S.E.2d 696 (1963).
217. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 703, 56 F.R.D. 282, 283.
218. 2 WIGMORE § 666, at 784.
219. Tyree, The Opinion Rule, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 601, 611 (1956), quoted in 3
WEINSTEIN T 703[01], at 703-6.
220. 3 WIGMORE § 688, at 803.
221. 3 WEINSTEIN T 703[021, at 703-10.
222. See text accompanying notes 291-95 infra.
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Thus, in Gentry v. Watkins-Carolina Trucking Co.22 the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling which
allowed a physician to testify concerning his patient's statements
of his present condition and past symptoms since this is
"information upon which he has relied in reaching his profes-
sional opinions. '2 4 The court's reasoning was sound. As Professor
Wigmore noted,
Medical science is a mass of transmitted and collated data
from numerous quarters; the generalizations which are the re-
sult of one man's personal observation exclusively are the least
acceptable of all. The law must recognize the methods of medi-
cal science. It cannot stultify itself by establishing, for judicial
inquiries, a rule never considered necessary by the medical pro-
fession itself. It is enough for a physician, testifying to a medical
fact, that he is by training and occupation a physician; whether
his source of information for that particular fact is in part or
entirety the hearsay of his fellow-practictioners and investiga-
tors is immaterial . . .
There is no logical reason why, given the reliability which shows
trustworthiness, any expert's opinion based on hearsay informa-
tion should not be admitted if it is of the type ordinarily relied
upon by an expert in his particular field. Indeed, rare is the case
where expert opinion would not embody hearsay indirectly.
26
South Carolina should recognize the element of trustworthiness
present in expert opinion which is based on the data of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in forming opinions upon the
223. 249 S.C. 316, 154 S.E.2d 112 (1967).
224. Id. at 324, 154 S.E.2d at 117.
225. 3 WIGMORE § 687, at 3.
226. In United States v. Williams, 424 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for rehearing
denied, 431 F.2d 1168 (1970), aff'd en banc, 447 F.2d 1285 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
954, rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 1048 (1972), the Fifth Circuit, en banc, explained the
rationale of rule 703 and noted that an expert's opinion is almost always grounded on
hearsay basis:
The rationale for this exception to the rule against hearsay is that the expert,
because of his professional knowledge and ability, is competent to judge for
himself the reliability of the records and statements on which he bases his expert
opinion. Moreover, the opinion of expert witnesses must invariably rest, at least
in part, upon sources that can never be proven in court. An expert's opinion is
derived not only from records and data, but from education and from a lifetime
of experience.
447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
Quite obviously this reasoning is equally applicable to experts other than physicians.
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subject in their particular field of competence and should allow
expert testimony when based on this type of information.
B. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
"The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these
rules is to admit them when helpful to the trier of fact. ' 2' Thus,
the Advisory Committee noted, the "ultimate issue" rule should
be and is abolished by rule 704 .11 This decision is in line with the
majority of the recent model acts and codifications. 2 1 South Car-
olina has never specifically rejected this rule although the trend
in recent decisions has been to lessen its effect.
In its most recent pronouncement on this issue, Redman V.
Ford Motor Company, Inc.,2° the South Carolina Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's arguments that the response of an expert
witness to a hypothetical question was a "conclusion on the very
issue before the jury and thus . . .[an invasion of] the jury's
province."1 It held, relying upon an earlier case, 2 2 that the "trial
judge has the discretion to permit expert testimony on the ulti-
mate issue before the jury." 3' The court correctly stated that in
such a situation "[tihere is no invasion of the province of the
jury, for the jury retains its power and duty to judge both the
credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his
opinion. 234 As one commentator has astutely noted, this reason-
ing "would, of course, be true in every case. ' 'ss Nevertheless, the
court did not completely "seal the coffin," as Professor Dreher
intimated, since it left the issue subject to further distinctions
should the case arise involving a lay opinion on the ultimate
issue.235
227. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 704, 56 F.R.D. 284 (1972).
228. FED. R. EVID. 704 provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.
229. See 3 WEINSTEIN 704[01], at 704-3.
230. 253 S.C. 266, 170 S.E.2d 207 (1969).
231. rd. at 278, 170 S.E.2d at 213.
232. O'Kelley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 197 S.C. 109, 14 S.E.2d 582 (1941).
233. 253 S.C. at 278, 170 S.E.2d at 213.
234. Id.
235. DREHER at 99.
236. Professor McCormick notes that in such a case the general rules of admissibility
of lay opinions might preclude opinions of laymen on the ultimate issue. However, under
rule 701 of the federal rules, the only excluding factor would be the general requirement
[Vol. 28
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The reasons for the rule against opinions on the "ultimate
issue" frequently have been taken to issue by the commentators.
The arguments, that such opinions "usurp the function of the
jury" or "touch the very issue before the jury," are properly
termed "mere bit[s] of empty rhetoric [and are] impracticable
and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in
reason."2 7 The efforts of the courts to comply with the rule led
to the development of "odd verbal circumlocutions which were
said not to violate the rule." 3' Thus
witnesses were sometimes required to couch their opinions in
cautious phrases of "might or could," rather than "did," though
the result was to deprive many opinions of the positiveness to
which they were entitled, accompanied by the hazard of a ruling
of insufficiency to support a verdict. In other instances the rule
was simply disregarded and, as concessions to need, opinions
were allowed upon such matters as intoxication, speed, hand-
writing, and value, although more precise coincidence with an
ultimate issue would scarcely be possible.29
South Carolina is among those courts which have engaged in
those "circumlocutions.
'40
The better reasoned approach to the problem of a witness'
"conclusions" is to abandon altogether the rule prohibiting opin-
ions on the ultimate issue. This would not result in the admission
of all opinions since they would still have to be "helpful" to the
trier of fact. 24' Legislative or judicial abrogation of this unwieldly
and burdensome rule would have numerous advantages over what
is still a potentially live issue in this state. Its abolition would
[eliminate] quibbles over the meaning of the ultimate fact, and
the distinction between fact and law . . . , [lend] the spectacle
of courts endorsing a principle which they cite only as a precur-
of "helpfulness." The South Carolina approach in this regard is the same. See note 211
supra.
237. 7 WIGMORE § 1921 at 17, § 1922 at 19.
238. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 704, 56 F.R.D. 284 (1972).
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Harrelson, 262 S.C. 38, 202 S.E.2d 1
(1974) (opinion on value of land allowed); State v. Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905
(1965) (lay witness' opinion as to person's sanity allowed); State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487,
129 S.E.2d 330 (1963) ("it seems like" allowed); State vA. Ramey, 221 S.C. 10, 68 S.E.2d
634 (1952) (lay witness' opinion on issue of intoxication allowed); Nelson v. Charleston &
W.C. Ry., 92 S.C. 151, 121 S.E. 198 (1911) (lay witness' testimony as to speed termed "too
fast" allowed).
241. See note 211 supra.
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sor to applying an exception . . . , [stop] the resort to indirect
means to bring the prohibited matter to the jury's attention,
and most importantly, it [would allow] the jury to receive the
full benefit of the witness' judgment. Both lay and expert wit-
nesses [could] testify in a more natural manner uninterrupted
by technical objections which interfere with the flow of the trial
but do not further the cause of truth."'
C. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
Prior to rule 705,43 an expert's opinion, if not based on his
own perception, had to be based on a preliminary statement of
the underlying facts or data upon which he relied. The method
designed to accomplish this requirement was the hypothetical
question. Rule 705 eliminates the requirement of using a hypo-
thetical question when the expert's opinion is not based on per-
sonal observation but yet accords the offering party the option of
using it. The only basis of expert opinion testimony in South
Carolina other than personal observation is the hypothetical
question."'
The use of the hypothetical question to expose each and
every fact relied upon by the expert in giving his opinion has been
severely derided by those who have discussed its use. Professor
Wigmore called it a device which is "misused by the clumsy and
abused by the clever [and which] has in practice led to intolera-
ble obstruction of truth. 25 He warned that "its abuses have
become so obstructive and nauseous that no remedy short of
extirpation will suffice." 4 ' Professor McCormick deemed it to be
"a failure in practice and an obstruction to the administration of
justice." '47 Judge Learned Hand labeled it "the most horrific and
grotesque wen on the fair face of justice. 2 11 In the face of such
242. 3 WEINSTEIN 704[011, at 704-10.
243. FED. R. EviD. 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the judge
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts of data on cross-examination.
244. Bailey v. MacDougall, 251 S.C. 290, 162 S.E.2d 177 (1968); State v. King, 158
S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1930).
245. 2 WIGMORS § 686, at 812.
246. Id.
247. McCoRMICK § 16, at 36.
248. New York Bar Association Lectures on Legal Topics 1921-22 (New York 1926),
quoted in MCCORMICK § 17, at 37 n.9. A good example of the ludicrous lengths to which
[Vol. 28
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vituperative criticism, rule 705 proves the generally advocated
expedient of dispensing with the required hypothesis and has
placed in its stead a permissive rule allowing the use of the hypo-
thetical question if the proponent so elects or if the trial judge
requires it. The cross-examiner may bring out the bases of that
opinion if he so desires. This the approach specifically advocated
by Wigmore 2 9 and which is gaining acceptance in various states
by judicial25 or legislative action.21
This method is without question superior to the previous rule
of making preliminary disclosure in the form of a hypothetical
question mandatory. It greatly simplifies the examination of an
expert and decreases the likelihood that the jury will be misled
by what have grown to be stereotyped, belabored, and nonsensi-
cal hypothetical questions. Yet its function - that of enabling
the jury to apply the expert's scientific knowledge to the facts of
the case - is not trod under foot but merely transferred to the
hands of the cross-examiner. South Carolina should adopt a rule
patterned along the lines of rule 705 abandoning the compulsory
use of hypothetical questions. By doing so, the theoretical object
of its use - the avoidance of misunderstanding22 - will be re-
tained and the expert will not be prohibited from explaining his
reasoning in a manner that is intelligible to the ordinary jury.
V. HEARSAY2 3
A. Prior Statement by a Witness
Under the definitional rule of article VIII, rule 801(d)(1)25
the use of hypothetical questions may be taken is found in Ingram v. McCuiston, 261 N.C.
392, 134 S.E.2d 705 (1964). The hypothetical question used in Ingram consists of 23
paragraphs and covers more than three pages of text. Id. at 394-99, 134 S.E.2d at 707-10.
249. How can the extirpating operation be performed? By exempting the
offering party from the requirement of using the hypothetical form; by according
him the option of using it, both of these to be left to the trial court's discretion;
and by permitting the opposing party, on cross-examination, to call for a hypo-
thetical specification of the data which the witness has used as the basis of the
opinion. The last rule will give sufficient protection against a misunderstanding
of the opinion, when any actual doubt exists.
2 WIGMORE § 686, at 813.
250. See, e.g., Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis. 2d 111, 172 N.W.2d 409 (1969).
251. See, e.g., KAN. Civ. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-458 (Vernon 1965); N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
LAW. § 4515 (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 907.05 (West 1975).
252. 2 WIGMORE § 672.
253. Omitted from textual discussion are the definitional provisions of rule 801.
Subsection (a) provides that a "statement" as an element of hearsay can be oral, written
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or nonverbal conduct of a person if intended by him as an assertion. South Carolina is in
accord except that the courts have yet to consider the issue of nonverbal conduct as
hearsay. Subsections (b) and (c) of rule 801 establish the traditional definitions of
"declarant" and "hearsay," respectively. See MCCORMICK § 246, at 584; 6 WIGMORE § 1766,
at 177-78. South Carolina is in accord. See Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d
531 (1972); State v. James, 255 S.C. 365, 179 S.E.2d 41 (1971).
Also omitted from textual discussion are the nonhearsay provisions of rule
801(d)(2)(A) and (B) which provide that an admission of a party opponent is not hearsay
if made by the party himself or by his representative or if adopted by him either expressly
or by his acquiescence. An admission is therefore admissible to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.
South Carolina law allows admissions to be introduced as evidence under the forego-
ing conditions. Eberhardt v. Forrester, 241 S.C. 399, 128 S.E.2d 687 (1962); Llewellyn v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 204 S.C. 156, 28 S.E.2d 673 (1944) (admissions made by a
party himself); Keen v. Army Cycle Mfg. Co., 124 S.C. 342, 117 S.E. 531 (1923); Hendrick-
son v. Miller, 4 S.C.L. (1 Mill) 296 (1817) (acquiescence in declaration made in presence
of a party). The admission involved in Hendrickson could not be used against an accused
in a criminal proceeding in contravention of his constitutional right to remain silent. See
State v. Bishop, 256 S.C. 158, 161, 181 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1971) ("The product of. . . [an]
interrogation is admissible in evidence, provided the. . . admission was freely and volun-
tarily made, and the procedural safeguards against involuntary or unwitting self-
incrimination required by Miranda v. Arizona. . . were observed.") (citation omitted).
Another area of confusion exists with regard to whether or not admissions must be
made against one's own interest. See Llewellyn v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 204 S.C. 156,
28 S.E.2d 673 (1944). Neither the federal rule nor the orthodox view requires that the
admission be against one's own interest. 4 WEINSTEIN T 801[01], at 801-116. However,
admissions have often been confused with declarations against interest.
The latter, coming in under a separate exception to the hearsay rule, to be
admissible must have been against the declarant's interest when made. No such
requirement applies to admissions. If a party states that a note or deed is forged,
and then later buys the note or the land, and sues upon the note or for the land,
obviously the previous statement will come in against him as an admission,
though he had no interest when he made the statement. Of course, most admis-
sions are actually against interest when made, but there is no such requirement.
Hence the common phrase in judicial opinions, "admissions against interest,"
is an invitation to confuse two separate exceptions to the hearsay rule and to
engraft upon admissions a requirement without basis in reason or authority.
Other apparent distinctions are that admissions must be the statements of a
party to the lawsuit (or his predecessor or representative) and must be offered,
not for, but against him, whereas the declaration against interest need not be
and usually is not made by a party or his predecessor or representative, but by
some third person. Finally, the declaration against interest exception admits the
declaration only when the declarant, by death or otherwise, has become unavail-
able as a witness, whereas obviously no such requirement is applied to admis-
sions of a party.
McCORMICK § 263, at 630-31 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 WIGMORE §§ 1048 & 1049;
Randall, Evidence, 1961 Survey of South Carolina Law, 14 S.C.L.Q. 44, 46 (1961). The
adoption of a uniform rule would clarify this point and help dispense with this erroneous
notion.
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) also allows the statement of a co-conspirator to be admitted against
a defendant as substantive evidence under the guise of an admission by a party-opponent
if made "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." This is the law in South
Carolina although courts speak of it in terms of an exception to the hearsay rule rather
than not being hearsay at all. See State v. Crowe, 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972); State v. Mikell, 257 S.C. 315, 185 S.E.2d 814 (1971).
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provides that under certain circumstances a prior statement
made by a witness is not hearsay. The preliminary requirement
is that the declarant be testifying at the trial or hearing and
subject to cross-examination on the statement. Three types of
prior statements may then be admitted: (1) one which is incon-
sistent with his present testimony if at the time it was given it
was made under oath; (2) one which is consistent with his pres-
ent testimony if offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive; and (3) one which pertains to the
identification of a person the witness perceived.
South Carolina follows the orthodox approach which is con-
trary to the federal rule since it rejects all prior statements of a
witness when offered substantively. The use of such evidence is
limited most frequently to impeachment purposes when they are
inconsistent with the testimony given at trial. 55 The reasoning
behind this approach is that the value of the statements depends
upon the credit of a declarant not under oath, who was not sub-
ject to demeanor observation by the trier of fact, and who was not
subjected to contemporaneous cross-examination." 6 Under rule
801(d) prior statements of a witness are substantively admissible
in large part because the purposes of the hearsay rule are ulti-
mately satisfied-the declarant is present under oath, subject to
As previously noted, this categorization is of little practical significance since "the practi-
cal consequences in any event is to admit the party's extrajudicial statement." 4
WEINSTEIN 801(d)(2) [01], at 801-111.
254. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if -
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hear-
ing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the state-
ment is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject
to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposi-
tion, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or mo-
tive, or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a
party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative
capacity or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief
in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the donspiracy.
255. See State v. Miller, 262 S.C. 369, 204 S.E.2d 738 (1974); State v. Bottoms, 260
S.C. 187, 195 S.E.2d 116 (1973).
256. 3A WIGMORE § 1018.
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demeanor observation, and amenable to thorough cross-
examination.257 Strong arguments can be made against the ortho-
dox rule. Noncontemporaneous cross-examination has repeatedly
been quite effective and the passage of time does not necessarily
cause a witness to harden and adhere to his uncross-examined
statement. In fact, a statement which is prior in time may be
more trustworthy since, as one authority has noted, "memory
hinges upon recency."' 5 An additional reason exists for allowing
the admission of a prior statement for substantive purposes when
it is inconsistent with that given at trial. Since under South Caro-
lina law juries may consider these statements for impeachment
purposes,2 1 it is quite realistic to assume that despite limiting
instructions, the jury, consciously or subconsciously, will decide
which statement is true and consider it as such rather than sim-
ply concluding that the witness' credibility is impaired.2 16 The
approach taken by rule 801(d)(1) (A) seems to be preferable since
it not only requires that the purposes of the hearsay rule be ulti-
mately satisfied but it also limits the use of a prior inconsistent
statement to one given under oath. It thus adds a safeguard to
the use of statements currently not present in the state system
where juries have, in all probability, been considering these state-
ments substantively without regard to the legal limitation to im-
peachment use only. 6'
257. 4 WEINSTEIN I 801(D)(1)[011.
258. MCCORMICK § 251, at 602.
259. State v. Bottoms, 260 S.C. 187, 193-94, 195 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1973).
260. MCCORMICK § 251, at 604.
261. The same arguments can be advanced with respect to the use substantively of
prior consistent statements offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or motive. Id.
South Carolina would apparently follow the rule set forth regarding prior inconsistent
statements, see note 258 and accompanying text supra, and limit their use to rehabilita-
tive purposes. Professor McCormick succinctly stated the reasoning against this position:
No sound reason is apparent for denying substantive effect when the statement
is otherwise admissible. The witness can be cross-examined fully. No abuse of
prepared statements is evident. The attack upon the witness has opened the
door. The giving of a limiting instruction is needless and useless. The trend is
in accord with these suggestions.
McCORMICK § 251, at 602 (footnote omitted).
Finally, under rule 801(d)(1)(C) a prior statement made by a witness identifying
another is admissible substantively since as pointed out by the Advisory Committee,
"identification in the courtroom is a formality that offers little in the way of reliability
and much in the way of suggestibility. The experienced trial judge gives much greater
credence to the out-of-court identification." 56 F.R.D. at 298 (1972); accord, 4 WIGMORE
§ 1130, at 210. The advantages of a uniform rule in the area of prior statements made by
a witness are numerous and rule 801(d)(1) offers a sound basis for constructing a state
counterpart for South Carolina.
[Vol. 28
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B. Authorized and Vicarious Admissions
If a party authorizes another to make a statement, then the
statement, if made, is treated as an admission of such party
under rule 801(d)(2) (C). The facts of agency and the fact that the
agent was acting within the scope of the agency by rendering the
report must be proven. This is the familiar "speaking authority"
requirement. 211 Subsection (C) is a restatement of the traditional
viewpoint and that adhered to in South Carolina. 2 3 The federal
rule, however, departs from the orthodox practice and broadens
the ambit of admissibility in rule 801(d)(2)(D) by characterizing
as an admission a statement made by an agent if it concerns a
matter within the scope of his employment and is made while the
relationship exists. The most frequent occasion to apply this vari-
ation arises where the principle-master is subject to tortious lia-
bility for the acts of his agent-servant and the latter makes a
statement highly probative on the issue of liability. The tradi-
tional, "speaking authority" rule would require exclusion of the
servant's statement since the employer had not authorized the
agent-servant to make damaging remarks about him.264 South
Carolina currently follows this viewpoint.
In Marshall v. Thomason,265 a majority of the supreme court
held as error the admission of a statement of defendant's truck
driver made to a highway patrolman investigating an accident in
which the truck and driver were involved. The majority based its
reasoning primarily upon the ground that "post accident declara-
tions or admissions [are] not within the scope of the agency of
one employed to drive a. . .vehicle. 1266 Justice Lewis in a lucid
dissent advocated the viewpoint currently followed by the federal
rule, pointing out that the appropriate inquiry is "whether the
driver in making the statements at the scene of the collision was
acting in the course of his employment, '26 7 and not whether he
had the authority to speak. As Justice Lewis aptly observed,
"[ilt is unrealistic, to say the least, to hold that the driver was
the agent of the employer for every purpose in connection with
262. MCCORMICK § 267, at 641.
263. Williams v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 138 S.C. 281, 136 S.E. 218 (1927);
accord, Hunter v. Hyder, 236 S.C. 378, 114 S.E.2d 493 (1960); 4 WIMoRE § 1078.
264. 4 WEINSTEIN 801[01], at 801-134. See also 4 WIGMORE § 1078, at 166.
265. 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962).
266. Id. at 92, 127 S.E.2d at 180.
267. Id. at 94, 127 S.E.2d at 181.
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the operation of the vehicle, except to truthfully relate the man-
ner in which he operated it. ' ' 21s Since frequently the agent will be
the only one who knew what happened,"9 rule 801(d)(2)(D) repre-
sents an enlightened expansion in the area of vicarious admis-
sions following the modern trend of authority.2 ° As Professor
McCormick has noted:
[T]he assumption that the test for the master's responsibility
for the agent's acts should be the test for using the agent's
statements as evidence against the master is a shaky one. The
rejection of such post-accident statements coupled with the
admission of the employee's testimony on the stand is to prefer
the weaker to the stronger evidence. The agent is well informed
about acts in the course of the business, his statements offered
against the employer are normally against the employer's inter-
est, and while the employment continues, the employee is not
likely to make the statements unless they are true. Moreover, if
the admissibility of admissions is viewed as arising from the
adversary system, responsibility for statements of one's em-
ployee is a consistent aspect."
VI. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
272
Federal Rule 803 lists 24 exceptions to the rule against hear-
268. Id. at 95, 127 S.E.2d at 182.
269. For some examples of this situation see 4 WEINSTEIN 801[01], at 801-135.
270. MCCORMICK § 267, at 641.
271. Id.
272. Rules 803(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (9), (18), and (22) are discussed in the text of this
note. The remaining hearsay exceptions are not significantly different from the law in
South Carolina and will be considered seriatim as follows: Rule 803(3)-Then existing
mental, emotional, or physical condition; accord, Gentry v. Watkins-Carolina Trucking
Co., 249 S.C. 316, 154 S.E.2d 112 (1967) (statements as to present condition made by a
patient to a physician consulted for treatment are generally admitted as evidence of the
facts stated); Corley v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 237 S.C. 439, 117 S.E.2d 577 (1960);
Ervin v. Myrtle Grove Plantation, 206 S.C. 41, 32 S.E.2d 877 (1945) (declarations made
by a party since deceased, at or about time of his departure, are admissible to establish
destination or purpose of journey). Rule 803(7)-Absence of entry in records kept in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6); see text accompanying notes 306-21
infra. Rule 803(8)-Public records and reports; accord, State v. Pearson, 223 S.C. 377,
76 S.E.2d 151 (1953); see State v. Fowler, 264 S.C. 149, 213 S.E.2d 447 (1975); Peagler v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 234 S.C. 140, 107 S.E.2d 15 (1959). Rule 803(10)-Absence of
public record or entry; see People's Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. Manos Bros., 226 S.C.
257, 84 S.E.2d 857 (1954) (nonexistence of an entry in a record book is admissible to prove
the truth of the matter asserted therein). Rule 803(11)-Records of religious
organizations; no comparable South Carolina rule can be found. Rule 803(12)-
Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates; accord, Williams v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 116 S.C. 277, 108 S.E. 110 (1921) (certificate of death is admissible in
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say. The rule is phrased in terms of nonapplication of the hearsay
rule, rather than in positive terms of admissibility, in order to
avoid any implication that other potential grounds for exclusion
are eliminated from consideration. The rule proceeds upon the
general theory that under appropriate circumstances an other-
wise inadmissible hearsay statement may possess circumstantial
evidence to establish the matters therein required to be recorded when within the knowl-
edge of the person making the certificate). Rule 803(13)-Family records; see Dobson v.
Cothran, 34 S.C. 518, 13 S.E. 679 (1891); Taylor v. Hawkins, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 164
(1821). Rule 803(14)-Records of documents affecting an interest in property; there is
no comparable rule in South Carolina. But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-105 (1962). Rule
803(15)-Statements in documents affecting an interest in property; there is no compa-
rable rule in South Carolina. Rule 803(16)-Statements in ancient documents; there is
no comparable rule in South Carolina. But see Goings v. Mitchell, 110 S.C. 380, 96 S.E.
612 (1818) (authentication of ancient documents). Rule 803(17)-Market reports,
commercial publications; accord, People's Nat'l. Bank of Greenville v. Manos Bros., 226
S.C. 257, 84 S.E.2d 857 (1954) (city directory admissible to prove domiciliary); Culbreath
v. Investors Syndicate, 203 S.C. 213, 26 S.E.2d 809 (1943) (where articles not traded on
regular market, witness familiar with sales prices at time may testify to establish the
correct market price); Kirkpatrick v. Hardeman, 123 S.C. 21, 115 S.E. 905 (1923) (pub-
lished quotation of market price of stocks and bonds and of commodities traded on a
regular market may be introduced as they appear in newspapers and trade journals). Rule
803(19)-Reputation concerning personal or family history; accord, Hazelwood v.
Mayes, 111 S.C. 23, 96 S.E. 672 (1918); Brown v. Foster, 41 S.C. 118, 19 S.E. 299 (1894);
Rule 803(20)-Reputation concerning boundaries or general history; accord, Sexton
v. Hollis, 26 S.C. 231, 1 S.E. 893 (1887); Speer v. Coate, 15 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 227 (1825).
Rule 803(21)-Reputation as to character; accord, State v. Outen, 237 S.C. 514, 118
S.E.2d 175 (1961); State v. Logue, 204 S.C. 171, 28 S.E.2d 788 (1944); State v. Merriam,
34 S.C. 16, 12 S.E. 619 (1891). Rule 803(23)-Judgment as to personal, family or
general history, or boundaries; there is no comparable rule in South Carolina. Rule
803(24)-Other exceptions; although there is no comparable rule in South Carolina, it is
believed that the trial court would have the inherent common law power to fashion special
exceptions to the rule against hearsay in individual cases. Rule 804(b)(1)-Former
testimony; the use of former testimony in court has long been recognized as an exception
to the hearsay rule. 5 WIGMORE § 1370. Its trustworthiness lies in the facts that it was given
under oath, is frequently in writing, and was subject to an opportunity to cross-examine.
Rule 804(b)(1) sets out these requirements. See generally 4 WEINSTEIN 804(b)(1)[01] to
[051. South Carolina follows this viewpoint and, like the federal rule, does not require
that the former action have been between the same parties so long as there was an
opportunity to cross-examine by the party against whom it was offered. Gaines v. Thomas,
241 S.C. 412, 128 S.E.2d 692 (1962); State v. Steadman, 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950). Rule 804(b)(2)-Statement under belief of impending
death; an old South Carolina case recognized the "necessity principle" of this exception
- that since the witness had died, there was a necessity for using the only available
trustworthy statements, his dying declarations. State v. Ferguson, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 619
(1835). The South Carolina Supreme Court has not considered the issue in recent times.
Although such declarations are limited in this State to homicide prosecutions arising out
of the declarant's death, the necessity principle does not need to be so limited since the
unavailability of the declarant may, although infrequently, be for other reasons. See note
273 and accompanying text infra.
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guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction
of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be
available."3 As in rule 804, the declarant is treated as a witness
and must therefore possess firsthand knowledge as to the matter
upon which his statement was made, which may be shown by his
statements or may be inferred from the circumstances.2Y Rule 804
lists five exceptions to the hearsay rule which are premised on a
preliminary showing that the declarant is unavailable. 25
A. Present Sense Impression and Excited Utterance
Rule 803(1)276 is the basic hearsay exception for statements
made while perceiving an event. There are three basic conditions
for meeting this exception: (1) the statement must be made while
the event or condition is being perceived by the declarant or
"immediately thereafter;" 7 (2) it must be established that in
fact the declarant perceived the event about which his statement
was made; and (3) the statement must describe or explain the
event or condition.
The rationale for the exception is that statements of percep-
tion that are contemporaneous with an event are highly trustwor-
thy because: (1) there is no memory problem since the statement
is simultaneous with the event; (2) there is little or no time for
calculated misstatement; and (3) the statement is usually made
to one who has equal opportunity to observe and check for
misstatements. 5
273. Advisory Committee's Note to FED R. Evm. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303 (1972).
274. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
275. See note 353 infra.
276. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) provides:
The following are not excluded as hearsay even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(1). . .A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately there-
after.
277. The Advisory Committee's Note states:
With respect to the time element, Exception (1) recognizes that in many,
if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not possible, and hence a slight
lapse is allowable. Under Exception (2) the standard of measurement is the
duration of the state of excitement. "How long can excitement prevail?" Ob-
viously there are not pat answers and the character of the transaction or event
will largely determine the significance of the time factor." Slough, Spontaneous
Statements and State of Mind, 46 IowA L. REv. 224, 243 (1961); McCormick
§ 272, at 580.
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Rule 803(2)279 excludes from the hearsay objection state-
ments made while under the influence of an exciting event or
condition. The underlying assumption for this exception "is that
a person under the sway of excitement precipitated by an external
startling event will be bereft of the reflective capacity essential
for fabrication and that, consequently, any utterance he makes
will be spontaneous and trustworthy."I
There are several important aspects or conditions to rule
803(2). First, the proponent must as a preliminary matter prove
that a "startling" event took place. This is usually satisfied by
the testimony of a witness other than the declarant or by other
circumstantial evidence. In some instances, where there is a lack
of circumstantial evidence to show that something out of the
ordinary occurred, the declarant's statements may sufficiently
establish that an event occurred and that it was of a startling
nature.2"' Second, since the rule requires that the declarant's
excitement be "caused" by the event or condition, it must be
shown that the declarant perceived the event. This does not
mean, however, that the declarant must be a participant in the
event or that his perception thereof must be proven by direct
evidence. Perception may be clear from the surrounding circum-
stances or from the nature of the statement. Third, it must be
shown that the declarant was "under the stress of excitement,"
279. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rules even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness:
(2) . . .A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the defendant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condi-
tion.
280. 4 WEINSTEIN 803(2)[01], at 803-80. Professor Wigmore stated that:
The general principle is based on the experience that, under certain external
circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be pro-
duced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the
utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual
sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this
utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the
senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not
have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be
taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of
untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker's belief
as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony
to those facts.
6 WGMORE § 1747, at 195.
281. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 304 (1972).
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i.e., that the declarant was excited because of the event and was
still excited when he made the statement. Fourth, it should be
noted that the federal rule, following Professor Wigmore,82 does
not require that the statement explain or elucidate the event,
although use of the word "relating" will limit the subject matter
of admissible statements to some degree." 3
The law in South Carolina comparable to federal rules
803(1) and (2) is the familiar res gestaeu4 exception. The South
Carolina Supreme Court has described the exception as follows:
To make declarations a part of the res gestae, they must be
contemporaneous with the main fact, not, however, precisely
concurrent in point of time. If they spring out of the transaction,
elucidate it, and are made at a time so near to it as reasonably
to preclude the idea of deliberate design, they are then regarded
as contemporaneous.2s
In another decision, the court stated that the statement must be
substantially contemporaneous with the litigated transaction,
and be the instinctive, spontaneous utterances of the mind
while under the active, immediate influences of the transaction;
the circumstances precluding the idea that the utterances are
the result of reflection or designed to make false or self-serving
declarations. 5
The requirement that the declaration "elucidate" the trans-
action is similar to the federal rule although care should be taken
not to apply the requirement so strictly as to exclude relevant
evidence from the jury's consideration.27 The federal rule appar-
282. 6 WIGMORE §§ 1750 & 1754.
283. Id.
284. See generally DREHER at 76-79.
285. Van Boven v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 239 S.C. 519,524, 123 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1962).
286. State v. Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938). See also Bagwell v. McLellan,
216 S.C. 207, 57 S.E.2d 257 (1949); Marks v. I.M. Pearlstine & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26
S.E.2d 835 (1943).
287. In Bagwell v. McLellan, 216 S.C. 207, 217, 57 S.E.2d 257, 262 (1949), the court
held that the statement must "unfold" the event or transaction. Consequently, the court
held that after the plaintiff had fallen, an excited witness' statement that the supermarket
floor was oily and slick was inadmissible under res gestae because it did not "unfold" the
event.
This requirement is far too restrictive. If the subject matter of the res gestae state-
ment is such as would likely be evoked by the event, the statement should be admitted.
See Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead, 90 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (clerk's statement, "That
has been on the floor a couple of hours," made after customer fell, held admissible).
Furthermore, as Professor Dreher has observed: it may be hard to distinguish "that floor
[Vol. 28
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ently contemplates some flexibility in the scope of permissible
subject matter of the statement: rule 803(1) requires the state-
ment to "describe or explain" the event, whereas rule 803(2) re-
quires only that the statement "relate" to the startling event.2 18
Moreover, the South Carolina requirement that the state-
ment be "substantially contemporaneous" with the event and
that the declarant's mind be under the "active, immediate influ-
ence" of the event is essentially concordant with the federal rule.
Both 803(1) and (2) require a showing of "perception" by the
declarant. Rule 803(1), recognizing that "precise contemporane-
ity" is impossible, permits a slight time lapse while rule 803(2)
measures the permissible time lapse by the duration of the state
of excitement which will depend largely on the character of the
event."9
The requirement that the declaration not be "self-serving"
has no counterpart in the federal rule. This additional require-
ment seems unwarranted. "If the statement is truly res gestae,
arising solely from the excitement of the occurrence, it should not
matter whether it is favorable or unfavorable to the declarant. ' '290
B. Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment
Rule 803(4)211 excludes from the operation of the hearsay rule
statements of present or past "symptoms, pain, or sensations"
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment or state-
ments describing the nature and cause of the injury insofar as
they bear on treatment. This exception is based on the rationale
that the declarant "would want to disclose the truth to the exam-
iner since his treatment would depend in part upon what he
said. 292 This is believed to be a sufficient guaranty of the trust-
worthiness of such statements. In addition, there is a practical
is slick" from "that truck is speeding." DREHER at 79.
288. See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 305 (1972).
289. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 304 (1972).
290. DREHER at 78-79.
291. FED. R. Evm. 803(4) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness:
(4). . .Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar
as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
292. See Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940).
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evidentiary need for such statements "because medical science is
unable to determine the existence of subjective symptoms with-
out indications by the person experiencing them.
293
The federal rule does not restrict this exception from the
hearsay rule to statements made to a physician. Statements to
hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the
family may be admissibles if "made for the purpose of diagnosis
or treatment. ' 294 In addition, the federal rule rejects the
"treating-nontreating" physician distinction. In the words of the
Advisory Committee:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay ex-
ception, as not within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements
to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling him
to testify. While these statements were not admissible as sub-
stantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis of
his opinion, incuding statements of this kind. The distinction
thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. The
rule accordingly rejects the limitation. This position is consis-
tent with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which
expert testimony is based need not be admissible in evidence if
of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in the field.21
The rule in South Carolina is contrary to that contemplated
by the federal rule. 29 In a 1967 case, Gentry v. Watkins-Carolina
Trucking Co.,' 9 the supreme court held that statements by a
patient to his physician with respect to the patient's medical
history and past symptoms are admissible to prove their truth
provided the statements were made with a view to treatment.
However, if the patient consulted the physician after suit had
commenced, as a prospective witness rather than for treatment,
the statements of present conditions or past symptoms are not
admissible as substantive proof of the facts so stated; but, in the
absence of fraud or bad faith, they are admissible "as information
upon which [the physician] has relied in reaching his profes-
293. Note, Medical Testimony and the Hearsay Rule, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 193, 199.
294. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 306 (1972).
295. Id.
296. South Carolina is in agreement with that part of the federal rule permitting a
physician to testify to what the patient told him concerning the "inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagno-
sis or treatment." See Code's Next of Kin v. Anderson Mills, 191 S.C. 458, 4 S.E.2d 908
(1939).
297. 249 S.C. 316, 154 S.E.2d 112 (1967).
[Vol. 28
66
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss4/5
EVIDENCE
sional opinions. ' ' 2s The Gentry court went on to state that
"[t]he parties are entitled to have the jury instructed as to the




As the Advisory Committee's note points out, however, it is
unrealistic to expect the jury to make the distinction called for
under the foregoing rule. The federal rule, therefore, seems prefer-
able and is likely to maximize the availability of relevant evi-
dence before the jury.
C. Recorded Recollection
An extrajudicial statement used to prove the truth of the
facts asserted is hearsay; correlatively, a recorded recollection of
extrajudicial statements used to prove the truth of the matters
asserted therein is also hearsay. Rule 803(5)1°° excepts the latter
from the exclusionary effect of the hearsay rule provided certain
conditions are met. The rule first requires that the testifying wit-
ness have "insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully
and accurately" before the content of the recorded recollection is
admissible.3 1 If the witness' memory is only slightly vague, the
trial judge should exercise his discretion by admitting only those
portions of the recorded recollection which bear thereon. Rule
803(5) also requires that the recorded recollection concern a mat-
ter "about which a witness once had knowledge." This is in con-
formity with the basic personal knowledge requirements for a
testifying witness under rule 602. Since by definition under ex-
ception (5) the witness is unable to directly testify to his percep-
tions, the federal rule seeks to ensure the reliability of the memo-
randum by requiring that it be "made or adopted by the witness
298. Id. at 324, 154 S.E.2d at 117.
299. Id.
300. FED. R. Evm. 803(5) provides:
The following are not excluded as hearsay, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(5) . . .A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a wit-
ness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness
when the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge cor-
rectly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but
may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
301. However, it may be admitted under other rules even if the witness does have
adequate knowledge. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (prior inconsistent statements),
801(d)(2) (admissions), 803(6) (record of regularly conducted activity).
1977]
67
Chandler and Runyan: The New Federal Rules of Evidence and South Carolina Evidentiary
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
when the matter was fresh in his memory" and the memorandum
must "reflect that knowledge correctly." This latter requirement,
ensuring that the transcription was carried out correctly, can be
satisfied by having the witness testify as to its accuracy (circum-
stances of its making) or testify that although he is now unable
to remember his state of mind while making the record, he would
not have made it unless it was correct (evidence of his habit or
practice to record such matters accurately) .312
The federal rule does not require the witness to be the person
who made the record; a witness who saw the memorandum made
when the matter it concerned was fresh in his memory and who
knew it to be correct may testify. Rule 803(5) also adopts the
position that the memorandum may be read into evidence but
cannot be taken as an exhibit to the jury room unless offered by
an adverse party or by stipulation of the parties. Of course, since
the document's contents are being proved, the best evidence rule
applies and the original must be produced.33
The law in South Carolina is basically concordant with the
federal rule except that (1) the memorandum must have been
made by the witness himself; (2) the memorandum itself is ad-
missible in evidence as an exhibit and may be taken to the jury
room; and (3) the document must have been made "contem-
poraneously" with the transaction.0 '
The third requirement probably differs from the federal rule
in degree only. Rule 803(5) requires the matter to be "fresh" in
the witness' memory; the South Carolina rule follows the more
restrictive tradition in requiring substantial contemporaneity of
the event and the witness' transcription thereof. The second
distinction in which South Carolina permits the memorandum to
go to the jury represents the view advocated by Professors Wig-
more and McCormick."' The Advisory Committee apparently
believed that to allow the document to enter the jury room would
be to give it greater credence than oral testimony-which ob-
viously cannot be taken into the jury room-and would be unduly
emphasized in relation to other testimony. Both positions appear
justifiable. As for the first distinction, the better approach would
302. 3 WiGMoRE § 747.
303. See FED. R. Evm. 1002.
304. Gwathmey v. Foor Hotel Co., 121 S.C. 237, 113 S.E. 688 (1922); O'Neal v.
Walton, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 234 (1845).
305. See 3 WIOMORE § 754; MCCORMICK § 278.
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be to not require the witness to be the maker of the document so
long as the other conditions of reliability and accuracy are satis-
fied. This would assure that the jury would have the benefit of
all the available relevant evidence.
D. Records of Regularly Conducted Activity
Rule 803(6)101 is the well known "business records" or
"regular entries" exception to the rule against hearsay. The gen-
eral rule in the federal courts and in a majority of the states is
that records prepared in the course of a regular business0 7 are of
sufficient reliability and trustworthiness that they should be ac-
cepted in evidence without a requirement that the person who
observed the recorded event or the maker of the record be avail-
able for cross-examination. The federal rule generally provides
that records prepared in the course of a regular business may be
admitted as substantive evidence of the facts recited therein
without regard to the type of transaction and without regard to
whether the records are those of a party or of a third person."'8
"The element of unusual reliability of business records is said
variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity
and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual expe-
rience of business is relying upon them, or by a duty to make an
accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation.""3 ' Rule
803(6) contains the following specific requirements: (1) each par-
ticipant in the chain producing the record-from the initial ob-
306. See FED. R. Evm. 803(6) which provides:
The following are not excluded as hearsay, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(6). . .A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form,
of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by,
or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other quali-
fied witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in
this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupa-
tion, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
307. See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvLn. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 308 (1972).
"The rule. . . adopts the phrase 'the course of a regularly conducted activity' as capturing
the essential basis of the hearsay exception as it has evolved and the essental element
which can be abstracted from the various specifications of what is a 'business.'"
308. See generally 4 WmNsTn4 803(6)[01] to [05].
309. Advisory Committee's Note to FED R. Evm. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 308 (1972).
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server reporter to the final entrant-must be acting in the course
of this regularly conducted business; 10 (2) the record must be
made "at or near the time" of the events recorded; (3) no distinc-
tion is to be made between recorded facts or opinions provided
there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness.31"
The law with respect to business records in South Carolina
was established in Seaboard A.L. Ry. v. Railroad Commrs.,
"'1 2
involving the admissibility of "tables made in the office of the
[Seaboard Railway] from the records of the company by clerks
employed for that purpose, and also of books of the company,
which showed in tabulated form its receipts and expenditures.
' 313
The supreme court admitted the reports, stating that a party
may introduce books of account, kept in the regular course of
business, upon identification of the account by the persons who
made and entered the transactions there recorded. But where
the person who made the sale or other transaction and entered
it is dead, or is for any other cause unavailable as a witness, on
the principle of nelcessity, the books may be introduced upon the
introduction of the best available proof of their verity ...
Obviously there can be no fixed rule as to what circumstances
establish such necessity, and what is sufficient proof of the ver-
ity of the books. These questions must be left almost entirely to
the discretion of the trial court."'
The essence of the court's holding in Seaboard is that records are
admissible as substantive evidence when the trial court finds
"necessity" and "verity"-necessity because of the unavailability
of the persons who made the report and verity because the cir-
cumstances under which the records are made and kept assure
their trustworthiness.
Seaboard and subsequent cases,3 5 therefore, stand for the
general proposition that entries made in the regular course of
business activity are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
In two relatively recent cases, however, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has added some additional limitations.
310. 4 WEINSTEIN 803(6)[02], at 803-147.
311. Id. At 803(6)[04], at 803-165.
312. 86 S.C. 91, 67 S.E. 1069 (1910).
313. Id. at 92, 67 S.E. at 1069.
314. Id. at 93, 67 S.E. at 1069-70.
315. See Currie v. Davis, 130 S.C. 408, 126 S.E. 119 (1923); United Grocery Co. v.
Dannelly & Son, 93 S.C. 580, 77 S.E. 706 (1913).
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In Wells v. Hays,3 16 a case involving a demand on a due bill,
the court held that books or records of businessmen are admissi-
ble to "prove accounts for goods sold and delivered, services ren-
dered, work and labor done, and materials furnished" but such
records are not admissible "for the purpose of proving special
contracts, such as are not shown by or to be inferred from the
entries alone. '31  Wells apparently stands for the rule that ac-
count records are inadmissible to prove matters other than the
amount of the account.
318
Finally, the court held in Watson v. Little31 1 that "a person's
books of account cannot be used as evidence upon issues between
third persons." The court considered such entries in a book of
account to be res inter alios acto with respect to third persons and
therefore inadmissible against them unless their intended use was
only to impeach the person recording or keeping the books of
account.
Thus the law of South Carolina32 apparently adopts the busi-
ness records exception to the rule against hearsay but carefully
restricts the exception to records of open accounts among parties
to the controversy. 31 These latter restrictions are not found in the
more liberal federal rule which favors increased admissibility
"unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustwothiness."
316. 93 S.C. 168, 76 S.E. 195 (1912).
317. Id. at 171, 76 S.E. at 196.
318. The Wells case was cited with approval in Green v. McDaniel, 168 S.C. 533, 168
S.E. 197 (1933), which held that books of account are only admissible to prove open
accounts between parties.
319. 229 S.C. 486, 490, 93 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1956).
320. A bill, number H. 2597, was recently introduced in the South Carolina General
Assembly proposing the adoption of the Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act. This
Act provides:
The term "business" shall include every kind of business, profession, occu-
pation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.
A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be compe-
tent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity
and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of
business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event and if, in the opinion
of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were
such as to justify its admission.
This section may be cited as the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act.
321. But see Currie v. Davis, 130 S.C. 408, 126 S.E. 119 (1923) (business record
admitted to prove time and place of train arrival).
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E. Records of Vital Statistics
Federal rule 803(9)322 sanctions the admission of records of
vital statistics-e.g., birth, marriage, and death reports-as an
exception to the rule against hearsay. Such records, usually made
by physicians, undertakers, and ministers performing an official
duty, have a guaranty of trustworthiness similar to the official
records excepted under rule 803(8). The federal rule only requires
that the maker of the record do so according to the requirements
of local law, and, therefore, a preliminary showing must be made
that such requirement was fulfilled.
South Carolina has acknowledged a similar exception. In
Williams v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 32 the supreme court
ruled that a death certificate is admissible to establish the mat-
ters asserted therein required to be recorded. This mirrors the
federal rule, and it can be assumed that the court would rule
similarly with respect to marriage or birth certificates if such were
completed in accordance with applicable law.
The last phrase of the court's holding, however, creates an
interesting, if minor, problem. The words "required to be re-
corded" would apparently serve to exclude information mistak-
enly included in a record from being admitted as proof of the
truth of such facts. Such an exclusionary limitation seems prima
facie correct "since the rationale of reliability furnished because
the recording was being done pursuant to a requirement of law is
absent.32 1 This would not necessarily be true, however, if the
person making the report or issuing the certificate believed that,
in fact, he was under a legal duty to include such information.
The federal rule would probably not preclude a proponent of such
a record from producing preliminary proof that the recorder
throught he was under a duty and could therefore be assumed to
have acted with the requisite care in making the record. '
Another potential distinction between the federal rule and
322. FED. R. EvID. 803(9) provides:
The following are not excluded as hearsay, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(9). . .Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal deaths,
deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant
to requirements of law.
323. 116 S.C. 277, 108 S.E. 110 (1921).
324. 4 WEINSTEIN 803(9)[01], at 803-189.
325. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 313 (1972).
[Vol. 28
72
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss4/5
EVIDENCE
South Carolina law stems from the language in Williams that a
record or report of vital statistics would not be admissible if the
matters contained in the report were not within the personal
knowledge of the reporter or if it "plainly appear[ed] impossible
to have been within his knowledge.
3 2 6
Although the Advisory Committee's note states in general
with respect to rule 803 that "[i]n a hearsay situation, the de-
clarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804
dispenses with the requirement of firsthand knowledge, ' ' 32 excep-
tion (9) to rule 803 is silent as to any firsthand knowledge require-
ment. To exclude statements in the report because of the absence
of personal knowledge on the part of the person making the report
is probably an unwarranted restriction. In the words of Professor
Wigmore:
It is sensible to admit all such entries for what they may be
worth; in the occasional controverted cases, other evidence is
usually available. A main purpose of the system would be de-
feated if the records were not liberally available in litigation.2s
It is here suggested that the South Carolina Supreme Court aban-
don the firsthand knowledge requirement stated in Williams in
view of the practical realization that "persons required by statute
to make reports on death [and a fortiori birth and marriage] are




Rule 803(18),330 admitting learned treatises as substantive
evidence, requires two initial conditions to be met: (1) the trea-
326. 116 S.C. at 279, 108 S.E. at 110.
327. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303 (1972).
328. 5 WIGMORE § 1646, at 713.
329. 4 WEN mST 803(9)[01], at 803-191.
330. FED. R. Evm. 803 (18) provides:
The following are not excluded as hearsay, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(18) . . .To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements con-
tained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history,
medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial
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tise must be disclosed while an expert is on the stand, either by
the expert during direct examination or by the opponent during
cross-examination; (2) it must be established as reliable author-
ity by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert
testimony or by judicial notice. In addition, the federal rule pro-
vides that statements in the treatise may be read into evidence
but may not be taken into the jury room as exhibits. This latter
limitation is based on the fear that to permit otherwise would
increase the likelihood that the jury could give the treatise greater
weight than it deserves.nI However, it should be noted that the
parties may stipulate to send the treatise into the jury room if
they so desire.
The law in South Carolina with respect to the admissibility
of learned treatises as substantive evidence-as established by
legislative and judicial fiat-is considerably narrower than that
contemplated by rule 803(18). South Carolina has long permitted
portions of "medical or scientific works . . . to be read before the
court or jury" in any civil or criminal proceeding where "the
question of sanity or insanity in the administration of poison or
any other article destructive to life is involved. ' 32 It is immedi-
ately clear that while the South Carolina statute addresses
"medical or scientific" works, the federal rule is not so limited,
providing for the admission of "statements contained in pub-
lished treatises, periodicals or pamphlets on a subject of history,
medicine or other science or art.
' '332. 1
In addition, the supreme court has interpreted the statute as
precluding the reading of medical or scientific works in court
except when the issue is one of insanity or the administration of
poison.33 "The restriction of their use to such cases is irrefutable
argument that they cannot be used in any other cases." 34 This
was clearly an unduly restrictive reading of the statute since it
would also appear to preclude the introduction of learned trea-
tises for purposes of impeachment. 35 The supreme court, how-
ever, has recognized the distinction between the use of treatises
as direct proof of an issue in controversy (an exception to the
331. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 316-17. See also
Comment, Evidence-Products Liability, 27 S.C.L. REv. 766 (1976).
332. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-142 (1962).
332.1. FaD. R. EvID. 803 (18).
333. Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 161 S.C. 479, 483, 159 S.E. 822, 823 (1931).
334. Id.
335. DREHEa at 11.
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hearsay rule) and their use as a method of impeachment on cross-
examination (which is not substantive and therefore is not hear-
say) .336
Thus the law in South Carolina is that a medical or scientific
treatise can only be admitted substantively if it relates to a ques-
tion of sanity or insanity in the administration of poison; other-
wise, a learned treatise may be admitted or judicially noticed
only for the limited purpose of impeachment on cross-
examination.37
The federal rule's more liberal approach is clearly preferable.
Treatises are a needed source of evidence and also possess the
requisite indicia of reliability.3 38 To conform the South Carolina
practice with that envisioned by the federal rule would (1) accord
with the realities of actual practice since all experts largely rely
upon the works published by authorities recognized in their field
and (2) obviate the unreality of expecting jurors to adhere to the
court's instructions to consider a treatise only for impeachment
purposes and not as substantive evidence. In the words of Profes-
sor Morgan, "it is absurd to listen to testimony based upon asser-
tions by the treatise writer while refusing to admit the asser-
tions."
339
G. Judgment of Previous Conviction
Rule 803(22)340 provides that evidence of a prior criminal
336. See, e.g., Baker v. Port City Steel Erectors, Inc., 261 S.C. 469, 470, 200 S.E.2d
681, 682 (1973); LaCount v. General Asbestos & Rubber Co., 184 S.C. 232, 234, 192 S.E.
262, 263 (1937).
'337. Baker v. Port City Steel Erectors, Inc., 261 S.C. 469, 200 S.E.2d 681 (1973);
Benford v. Berkeley Heating Co., 258 S.C. 357, 360, 188 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1972) (taking
judicial notice of learned treatise on heat transfer).
338. See 4 WEINSTEIN 803(18)[01], at 803-214 to -216 (reciting numerous indicia of
reliability).
339. MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 366 (1962), quoted in 4 WEINSTEIN
803(18)[01], at 803-217.
340. FED. R. Evm. 803(22) provides:
The following are not excluded as hearsay, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(22) . . .Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea
of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere) adjudging a person guilty of
a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any
fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the
government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment,
judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal
may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
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judgment may be offered in evidence at a subsequent civil or
criminal proceeding "to prove any fact essential to sustain the
judgment."34' Since the judgment represents the opinion of twelve
uncross-examined persons, it is excludable hearsay. Most com-
mentators consider this objection to the admission of judgments
a "purely technical obstacle" 342 and records of a previous convic-
tion are clearly admissible in any case under the public records
exception of rule 803(8).
The judgment of conviction or guilty plea must be of a felony
grade ("punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year")34 3 and may be admitted in either civil or criminal litigation
except that judgments against third persons are only admissible
by the government for purposes of impeachment in criminal
cases.3
44
Rule 803(22) does not make the prior conviction conclusive
as to the facts determined therein and, consequently, the accused
may endeavor to offer a satisfactory explanation. Moreover, it is
within the discretion of the trial judge, regardless of the judg-
ment's conclusiveness, to determine which facts were "essential"
to the prior judgment and are not admissible in evidence. Finally,
the federal rules allow the pendency of an appeal to be shown for
the jury to evaluate as they wish but such a showing does not
affect the admissibility of the judgment of conviction." '4
The leading case in South Carolina on this matter is South
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Breeland,346 in
which the supreme court recited the general rule that a judgment
of conviction in a criminal prosecution is not an adjudication
binding the defendant in a subsequent civil action. The rule is
justified on the ground that
[tihe want of mutuality, arising out of the fact that the parties
to the record are not the same, and the fact that the course of
341. Prior civil judgments are inadmissible because the lower applicable burden of
proof makes them less reliable than criminal judgments.
342. Note, Judgments as Evidence 46 IOWA L. REv. 400 (1961), quoted in 4 WEINSTEIN
803(22)[011, at 803-229.
343. This is based on the theory that when crimes of a lesser magnitude are involved,
the motivation to defend may be concomitantly lessened. See Advisory Committee's Note
to FED. R. EVID. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 319 (1972).
344. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
345. See generally 4 WEINSTEIN 803(22)[011, at 803-229 to -238.
346. 208 S.C. 469, 38 S.E.2d 644 (1938).
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the proceedings and the rules of decision in the two courts are
different. 7
However, the Breeland court went on to conclude that in public
or quasi-public actions an exception to the general rule will be
recognized and previous judgments of conviction will be admit-
ted.3 8 Thus in actions for the revocation of a professional license,
evidence of facts contained in a prior judgment of conviction is
admissible.
The court's justification for the general rule is based on the
common law maxim, res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,
that an action between two parties ought not operate to the detri-
ment of a third. 4 The mutuality objection, however, is off the
mark:
The appropriate question in deciding whether the hearsay objec-
tion should be sustained in this context is not the party's oppor-
tunity to have been present at the official investigation but
rather whether the investigation provided adequate assurance of
reliability.35
Furthermore, the trial judge has discretion (in the federal courts
pursuant to rule 403 and in South Carolina as an inherent com-
mon law power) to exclude evidence unfairly prejudicial or evi-
dence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of delay, thereby overcoming objections that the jury
might "misuse" evidence of prior judgments of conviction or that
the trial will be unduly protracted by efforts to rebut or explain
the prior judgment. The federal rule, therefore, represents the
better approach since it recognizes "that the law's fact-finding
process leads to decisions sufficiently reliable so that they should
be given weight," particularly since a law of exclusion would
deprive the jury of valuable, highly relevant evidence."'
347. 208 S.C. at 471, 38 S.E.2d at 646, quoting Fonville v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
93 S.C. 287, 75 S.E. 173 (1912).
348. See also Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Foil, 189 S.C. 91, 200 S.E. 97 (1938);
Keels v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 159 S.C. 520, 157 S.E. 834 (1931).
349. Id. at 472, 38 S.E.2d at 647-48.
350. 4 WEINSTEIN 803(22)[01], at 803-230.
351. MCCORMICK § 318, at 739. The argument in favor of evidence of prior judgments
has been persuasively stated as follows:
The judgment possesses great probative force, since it manifests persuasion of
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The convicted party has had his day in
court. Assuming the criminal charge was serious enough to motivate him to put
forth his best efforts and to motivate the jury to put forth their best efforts, no
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H. Statement Under Belief of Impending Death
Rule 804(b)(2)12 is an expanded version of the common law
dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. It differs from the
common law rule, however, in two primary respects - the rule's
scope has been broadened by allowing its use in civil cases as well
as the traditional homicide case and in no longer limiting the
reason for unavailability to death.353 South Carolina recognizes
this exception to the hearsay rule but differs from rule 804(b)(2)
in at least one of the two areas of the rule's expansion. 54
South Carolina limits the use of such declarations to criminal
cases of homicide by requiring that "the 'subject of the charge'
must be the death of the declarant. '355 The birth of this "heresy"
unfairness results in using the judgment as evidence against him in another
case.
4 Calif. Rev'n. Comm'n, Reports, Recommendations and Studies, A Study Relating to the
Hearsay Evidence Article of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 401, 540 (1962), quoted in 4
WEINSTEIN T 803(22)[01], at 803-231 n.12.
352. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(2) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is una-
vailable as a witness:
(2) . . .In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a
statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent,
concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending
death.
353. For the exceptions embodied in rule 804 to be available to a proponent it must
be found as a preliminary fact that the declarant is unavailable. Rule 804(a) specifies five
instances in which a declarant is "unavailable": (1) a successful claim of privilege pre-
vents the declarant from testifying about his statement; (2) the declarant refuses to testify
despite judicial pressure; (3) the declarant establishes as a witness a lack of memory on
his part concerning the statement; (4) the declarant is dead or has an existing infirmity;
(5) the declarant is absent and the proponent has been unable to compel his attendance.
If the proponent's wrongdoing is the cause of the declarant's unavailability under any of
these provisions, the declarant is not considered unavailable.
South Carolina recognizes the requirement of the declarant's unavailability when
dealing with these hearsay exceptions, but it has infrequently enumerated those instances
in which a declarant is unavailable. The most frequently accepted reason is that the
declarant is dead. Gaines v. Thomas, 241 S.C. 412, 128 S.E.2d 692 (1962). Other instances
have been enumerated in a case involving the use of former testimony - the declarant's
insanity, his absence from the jurisdiction, and where the declarant's attendance has been
somehow prevented by a contrivance of the opposite party. State v. Steadman, 216 S.C.
579, 59 S.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850, rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 894 (1950).
354. State v. Bethea, 241 S.C. 16, 126 S.E.2d 846 (1962).
355. Rule 804(b)(4) codifies one of the oldest exceptions to the hearsay rule by allow-
ing a statement of personal or family history to be admitted. 5 WIGMORE § 1480. It differs
from the common law view in three major respects: (1) the ante litem motam requirement
is dropped; (2) death is not the only means of unavailability; and (3) declarations of
nonfamily members are admissible if they were intimately associated with the family to
provide the necessary trustworthiness.
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as it is called by Professor Wigmore35 came about in the miscon-
strued words of an old English treatise writer s.35  The principle
rests upon incorrect assumptions since
it is of as much consequence to the cause of justice that robber-
ies and rapes be punished and torts and breaches of trust be
redressed as that murder be detected; the notion that a crime
is more worthy of the attention of courts than a civil wrong is a
traditional relic of the days when justice was administered in
the royal courts as a purchased favor, and criminal prosecutions
in the king's name were zealously encouraged because of the
fines which they added to the royal revenues. The sanction of a
dying declaration is equally efficacious whether it speaks of a
murder or a robbery or a fraudulent will; and the necessity being
the same, the admissibility should be the same.-"
Many jurisdictions have abandoned these common law limi-
tations by judicial or legislative decision.3 9 One limitation of rule
804(b)(2) is that it differs from the version promulgated by the
Supreme Court in that all criminal cases except homicides are
excluded. The stated reason for this Congressional limitation was
that dying declarations were not considered to be the most relia-
ble forms of hearsay, but since the need for such declarations was
greater in homicide prosecutions3 0 they should be admissible in
South Carolina follows the general rule admitting statements of personal family his-
tory, even to the extent of admitting declarations of non family members in accordance
with rule 801(b)(4). McLain v. Allen, 95 S.C. 152, 79 S.E. 1 (1913). "Unavailability" other
than death is also recognized in this state. Robinson v. Blakely, 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 586
. (1851). It is uncertain whether this state still adheres to the ante litem motam requirement
- that the declarations must have been made before the controversy arose. Nevertheless,
the sufficient degree of trustworthiness to satisfy the hearsay rule rests on the assumption
that the type of declarant specified by rule 801(b)(4) would not make a statement about
the type of fact covered by the rule unless it were true.
356. 5 WIGMORE § 1431, at 277.
357. Sergeant East in 1803 stated that:
Besides the usual evidence of guilt in general cases of felony, there is one kind
of evidence more peculiar to the case of homicide, which is the declaration of
the deceased, after the mortal blow, as to the fact itself, and the party by whom
it is committed. Evidence of this sort is admissible in this case on the fullest
necessity; for it often happens that there is no third person present to be an
eyewitness to the fact; and the usual witness on occasion of other felonies,
namely, the party injured himself, is gotten rid of.
Sergeant East, 1 Pleas of the Crown 353 (1803), quoted in 5 WIGMORE § 1431, at 277-78.
358. 5 WIGMORE § 1436, at 285.
359. Id. at 287 n.4.
360. REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENcE, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
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that criminal context but not others. This reasoning appears
weak, since carried to its logical end, this would limit their use
solely to criminal homicide prosecutions where the "necessity" is
ostensibly the greatest, disregarding their equally efficacious ap-
plication to all cases, criminal or civil.
I. Statements Against Interest
A declaration against one's pecuniary or proprietary interest
or one which would subject the declarant to criminal liability is
made generally admissible by rule 804(b)(3).11 Rule 804(b)(3)
broadens the common law rule on statements against interest by
allowing the admission of a declaration against one's penal inter-
ests. The logic of this welcomed change is based upon the under-
lying principle of this exception - that persons are not likely to
make damaging statements against themselves unless they are
true."' A person, therefore, is considered just as unlikely to make
a statement which would subject him to criminal liability as he
would be to damage his pecuniary or proprietary obligations.
South Carolina's most recent pronouncement on this issue
was in the case of McLain v.Anderson Free Press.363 The court
there recognized the doctrine as it applies to statements against
one's pecuniary and proprietary interests but split on whether it
also applied to the admission of declarations against one's penal
interest. Two justices felt that the exception does not extend to
delcarations against one's penal interest.64 The majority opinion
361. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is una-
vailable as a witness:
(3) . . .A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him
to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless
he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corrobor-
ating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
362. 5 WiomoRE § 1457, at 329:
The basis of the exception is the principle of experience that a statement assert-
ing a fact distinctly against one's interest is unlikely to be deliberately false or
heedlessly incorrect, and is thus sufficiently sanctioned, though oath and cross-
examination are wanting.
363. 232 S.C. 448, 102 S.E.2d 750 (1958).
364. Justice Taylor concurred in the portion of Justice Moss' opinion dealing with
declarations against one's penal interest. Two others, Justice Oxner and Justice Stukes,
concurred in the result.
[Vol. 28
80
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss4/5
EVIDENCE
based its decision on a series of treatises and cases which stated
that most American courts have held the same.36 The one dis-
senting justice found it "difficult to perceive sound reason for
excluding a declaration against penal interest while admitting
one against pecuniary interest." 6 ' A dissenting opinion by Justice
Holmes in the case primarily relied upon by the McLain majority
betrays the faulty logic of this rule. In one of his more vituperative
and cogent dissents, the late Justice Holmes, in voicing his posi-
tion on the question of admitting the confession of a murderer,
stated that
[t]he rules of evidence in the main are based on experience,
logic and common sense, less hampered by history than some
parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by this court
against the admissibility of such a confession, the English cases
since the separation of the two countries do not bind us, the
exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against
interest is well known; no other statement is so much against
interest as a confession of murder, it is far more calculated to
convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang
a man, Matloy v. United States, 146 U.S. 140; and when we
surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of which
seem to me excessive, I think we ought to give him the benefit
of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight.367
Another argument frequently advanced against the admis-
sion of statements is that the "floodgates" will be opened to wit-
nesses falsely testifying to confessions that were never made.38
The weakness of this argument is readily apparent since the dan-
ger of perjured testimony is present with all human testimony.
Additionally, Professor Wigmore was probably correct in con-
cluding that "any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerat-
ing himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely
passing for an innocent.
'369
Depsite the opinion of what appears to be a majority of the
court, three justices felt that declarations against one's penal
interest should be admissible. Justice Legge argued for their
365. 232 S.C. at 459, 102 S.E.2d at 756.
366. 232 S.C. at 469-70, 102 S.E.2d at 761 (Legge, J., dissenting).
367. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277-78 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
368. McCoRMICK § 278, at 674.
369. 5 WIGMoRE § 1477, at 359.
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general admissibility370 while Justices Oxner and Stukes felt that
these declarations should be admitted but in a limited fashion.
The latter two felt that a declaration against one's penal interest
while admissible against the declarant could not be admitted
against a third party.3 1 This reasoning is illogical, and it confuses
the doctrine admitting declarations against interest with that
admitting admissions of a party. Obviously, if admissible only
against the declarant, the statement would be admissible anyway
as an admission of a party. Thus the court has created the ap-
pearance of adhering to the rule admitting penal declarations but
has in reality created only an illusion with the limitations placed
upon its use.
Should the South Carolina Supreme Court be called upon to
consider this issue again, it is hoped that they will adhere to the
logic of the growing number of decisions abandoning this mis-
guided rule.372
The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation
are shocking to the sense of justice; for in its commonest appli-
cation it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of a confes-
sion, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane
or fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable)
who has avowed himself to be the true culprit. The absurdity
and wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is pat-
ent ...
It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to dis-
card this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an inno-
cent accused vindicate himself even by producing to the tri-
bunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the
very gallows, by the true culprit now beyond the reach of jus-
tice. 13
VII. CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset,7 our fundamental objective has not
been to survey the law of evidence in South Carolina but rather
to emphasize to the legal community and to the legislature the
370. For citations to those courts abandoning the rule applied by the McClain major-
ity, see MCCORMICK § 278, at 674 nn. 36, 37. See also CAL. EvD. CODE § 1230 (West 1975);
KAN. EviD. ANN. § 60-4606) (Vernon 1965).
371. 5 WIGMORS § 1477, at 359-60.
372. 232 S.C. 469, 102 S.E.2d 750, 761-62 (1958).
373. Id. at 470, 102 S.E.2d at 760-61.
374. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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superiority of a uniform code of evidence over the current ad hoc
method of creating and expounding rules of evidence on a case-
by-case basis. The adoption of a uniform code would force crea-
tive thought into the areas where outdated rules still exist and
because of the controversy stirred by debate, the true reasons and
policies underlying specific rules would more likely be articu-
lated. Additionally, a carefully formulated codification of the
rules of evidence would provide the judiciary and the bar with
more workable and more easily accessible authority for their
positions.
A number of jurisdictions in the United States have adopted
a uniform code of evidence,1 5 many paralleling the federal
rules.371 We do not advocate the verbatim adoption of the federal
rules. We do offer them as an example, probably the best, of a
workable formulation of the rules of evidence due to the fact that
they are the product of much judicial and legislative debate
thereby producing well-reasoned and well-articulated rules of evi-
dence. It is our hope that South Carolina will not be long in
following the lead of other states and of the federal system in
adopting a uniform code of evidence.
William B. Chandler III
C. Alan Runyan
375. As of July 1, 1976, six states have adopted various forms of the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 et seq. (Supp. 1976) (based on the 1974
Uniform Rules of Evidence, which in turn, are based on the Final Draft of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973)); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Maine Rules of
Evidence (Supp. 1975) (based on the final version of the federal rules approved by
Congress); Nebraska, N a. REv. STAT. §§ 27-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975) (based on the final
version of the federal rules approved by Congress); Nevada, Nav. REv. STAT. §§ 47.020 et
seq. (1973) (based on the Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D.
161 (1969)); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01 et seq. (Interim Supp. 1976) (based
on the final version of the federal rules approved by Congress); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 901.01 et seq. (1975) (based on the Final Draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence
promulgated by the Supreme Court, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973)).
376. See note 375 supra.
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